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ABSTRACT
We argue that the disincentive effect of a debt overhang is generally small and
consequently that debt reduction does not lead to important efficiency gains on this account.
Instead, we deve}op a framework that highlights the inefficiency created by the liQuidity
constraint faced by over-indebted countries. Often, adjustment/investment opportunities that
are profitable at the world interest rate cannot be undertaken for lack of sufficient funds.
New creditors are deterred from investing as they expect to be 'taxed" by the old creditors
who stand to gain disproportionatdy. This leads to an inefficient situation when a class of
new creditors have a comparative advantage relative to the old creditors. We tocus on the
time inconsistency introduced by the shortage of liquidity. New (unconditional) loans will be
consumed rather than invested. In this context conditional lending can release the liquidity
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create the "headroom" needed for these new and more efficient creditors to step in.
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I. Introduction and Overview
The debt crisis of the eighties had many dimensions. The attention of
policy makers focused first on the banking aspect of the crisis. A concerted
response, led by the International Monetary Fund and the U.S. Federal Reserve,
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lossreserves over time. By 1985, the banking sector was no longer in a state
of imminent collapse, and attention focused on the developmental crisis of the
highly indebted countries. Official intervention shifted to generating the
incentives and support for policies that would allow the debtors to grow Out
of their debt crisis. By 1989, and although several countries were reentering
a period of growth, it becanie clear that adjustment policies alone would not
......1'h,AC..-,,..4A 1A I. CaJ1_VC t.LLC ACIJI.. JVCLIIatL SLIC LJI..LL¼SCLIJLJL'J V J_¼SSLL&LLCWLIILJLIC•7StaLL aLi L_ LCLA
considerably to the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) (see tables 1
and 2), and a multilateral lending crisis loomed on the horizon. As a result,
the IFIs were beginning to reduce their involvement and adjustment programs
were failing for lack of sufficient financial support. The Brady plan,
announced that year, etnphasized for the first time debt reduction on the part
of commercial banks, to be undertaken simultaneously with adjustm€nt programs
01 t_ ,I —- -— t. .r%,-_ 1Jnancea oy aQQiLionaL joans Lrom iris. evetai aeot pacrages nave since dec..
negotiated (in Mexico, Costa Rica, Philippines, Venezuela and Uruguay) based
on these principles.
This paper focusses on two key aspects of the debt problem. First, is
there a good rationale for the tripartite arrangements among commercial banks,
IFIs. and debtor governments that we are now observing? To answer this
question, we need to have a good understanding of the inefficiencies created
by tte debt crisis. Second, how do these arrangements split ttie COStS anc
benefits among the participants? In other words, how does burden sharing work
Debt  Bedaction,  Adjustlent  Lending,  and  Burden  Sharing 
I.  Introduction  and  Overview 
The  debt  crisis  of  the  eighties  had  many  dimensions.  The  attention  of 
policy  makers  focused  first  on  the  banking  aspect  of  the  crisis.  A  concerted 
response,  led  by  the  International  Monetary  Fund  and  the  U.S.  Federal  Reserve, 
allowed  the  commercial  banks  to  reduce  their  exposure  and  boost  their  loan 
loss  reserves  over  time.  By  1985,  the  banking  sector  was no  longer  in  a  state 
of  imminent  collapse,  and  attention  focused  on  the  developmental  crisis  of  the 
highly  indebted  countries.  Official  intervention  shifted  to  generating  the 
incentives  and  support  for  policies  that  would  allow  the  debtors  to  grow  out 
of  their  debt  crisis.  By  1989,  and  although  several  countries  were  reentering 
a  period  of  growth,  it  became  clear  that  adjustment  policies  alone  would  not 
resolve  the  debt  overhang.  The  burden  of  providing  new money  had  shifted 
considerably  to  the  International  Financial  Institutions  (IFIs)  (see  tables  1 
and  2),  and  a  multilateral  lending  crisis  loomed  on  the  horizon.  As  a  result, 
the  IFIs  were  beginning  to  reduce  their  involvement  and  adjustment  programs 
were  failing  for  lack  of  sufficient  financial  support.  The  Brady  plan, 
announced  that  year,  emphasized  for  the  first  time  debt  reduction  on  the  part 
of  commercial  banks,  to  be  undertaken  simultaneously  with  adjustmcn:  programs 
financed  by  additional  loans  from  IFIs.  Several  debt  packages  have  since  bet: 
negotiated  (in  Mexico,  Costa  Rica,  Philippines,  Venezuela  and  Uruguay)  based 
on  these  principles. 
This  paper  focusses  on  two  key  aspects  of  the  debt  problem.  First,  is 
there  a  good  rationale  for  the  tripartite  arrangements  among commercial  banks, 
IFIs,  and  debtor  governments  that  we  are  now  observing?  To  answer  this 
question.  we  need  to  have  a  good  understanding  of  the  inefficiencies  created 
by  the  debt  crisis.  Second,  how  do  these  arrangements  split  the  costs  and 
benefits  among  the  participants?  In  other  words.  how  does  burden  sharing  work -3-
;.,t4.aca .rrnaaynpntc? In nnwerinD these ntiest{an wewillrelyona Lit tui% — , -
unifiedconceptual framework. Our objective, however, is to clarify the
issues and the analytics, rather than to present the solution of a specific
model of bargaining.
The conceptual underpinning of the need for debt reduction is provided by
thenotionof a "debt overhang", defined by Kruginan (1987) as "the presence of
an existing, 'inherited' debt sufficiently large that creditors do not expect
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onthe debt of highly-indebted government is prima facie evidence of a debt
overhang of this sort. This notion has been subject to much discussion, and
has possibly contributed as much confusion as clarification. Another
objective of this paper is to provide a systematic discussion of the issues
raised by the debt overhang.
Our main points can be suzimiarized in the form of answers to a series of
mar C. flu amP nn C
(1) Does thedebtoverhanghaveserious efficiency consequences?
The real cost of the overhang is that many high-yielding investnents ir
debtor countries go unexploited because these countries are shut out of credit
markets and cannot borrow. This is the central inefficiency created by the
debt crisis. The notion of investment has to be viewed broadly here. It
rnfnrctn riimmii1 tSnn in hnmnnrniPsi1. .rhrrsitohcnanAincnn adiir,t-i nn sinri
health- -as well as in physical capital such as machinery and infrastructure.
It also captures many types of policy reform, including structural reform and
macroeconomic stabilization, whose long-term benefits may come at the expense
of short-term costs. The liquidity shortage caused by the overhang leads to
the crowding out of many such desirable investments in the country's future.
in  these  arrangements?  In  answering  these  questions,  we  will  rely  on  a 
unified  conceptual  framework.  Our  objective,  however,  is  to  clarify  the 
issues  and  the  analytics,  rather  than  to  present  the  solution  of  a  specific 
model  of  bargaining. 
The  conceptual  underpinning  of  the  need  for  debt  reduction  is  provided  by 
the  notion  of  a  "debt  overhang",  defined  by  Krugman  (1987)  as  "the  presence  of 
an  existing,  'inherited'  debt  sufficiently  large  that  creditors  do  not  expect 
with  confidence  to  be  fully  repaid."  The  existence  of  deep  market  discounts 
on  the  debt  of  highly-indebted  government  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  a  debt 
overhang  of  this  sort.  This  notion  has  been  subject  to  much  discussion,  and 
has  possibly  contributed  as  much  confusion  as  clarification.  Another 
objective  of  this  paper  is  to  provide  a  systematic  discussion  of  the  issues 
raised  by  the  debt  overhang. 
Our  main  points  can  be  summarized  in  the  form  of  answers  to  a  series  of 
specific  questions: 
(1)  Does  the  debt  overhang  have  serious  efficiency  consequences? 
The  real  cost  of  the  overhang  is  that  many  high-yielding  investments  ir 
debtor  countries  go  unexploited  because  these  countries  are  shut  out  of  credit 
markets  and  cannot  borrow.  This  is  the  central  inefficiency  created  by  the 
debt  crisis.  The  notion  of  investment  has  to  be  viewed  broadly  here.  It 
refers  to  acummulation  in  human capital--through  spending  on  education  and 
health--as  well  as  in  physical  capital  such  as  machinery  and  infrastructure. 
It  also  captures  many  types  of  policy  reform,  including  structural  reform  and 
macroeconomic  stabilization,  whose  long-term  benefits  may  come at  the  expense 
of  short-term  costs.  The  liquidity  shortage  caused  by  the  overhang  leads  to 
the  crowding  out  of  many  such  desirable  investments  in  the  country's  future. -4-
This illiquidity effect on investment has to be distinguished from the
"disincentives' effect on which much writing has focussed. The disincentive
effect arises from the likelihood that an increase in the output of a country
innarhnna tn 11 1 nnd al cn tnAninrr.nc t tC IIDht carr4rathnrafr,ra rka
proceeds of domestic investment are shared, at least in part, with foreign
creditors. In principle, this acts just like a tax on investment, decreasing
the social return to domestic investment. However, there is no compelling
conceptual reason to believe that an aggregate 'tax,ifitexists,is
internalized in private investment behavior: from the perspective of an
individual investor, the aggregate transfer to creditors is an exogenous
constant which is unaffected bythedecisions of a small investor
Consequently, even if the social disincentive were large, the private
disincentive would still be small.
The empirical importance of the disincentive effect is not clear
either. For one thing, both the average and marginal taxratesimplied by
debt service are small: net transfers to creditors rarely exceed 4.5 percent
of GNP, and the experience after 1982 has been that creditors can capture only
1u,ttwn rsnrc nut- nif an,, Anllar inrrnaca In Inrnmn (cc.a ,-h1p 1 and the
discussion in Eaton, 1990). In fact, there is no empirical evidence in cross-
sectional studies, thata tax, nomatter how small, is attached to the
adjustment effort where the transfers to conmercial creditors is concerned
(see cable 3). Single-country investment equations (for example, orensztein
[1990] on the Philippines, Schmidt-Hebbel [1989] on Zrazil, and Morisset
[1991] on Argentina) and panel regressions (e.g. Ozier and Rodrik [1991])
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ispossible that such results are driven by the correlation between growing
debt and declining output in these countries in the 1980s, rather than by
-4- 
This  illiquidity  effect  on  investment  has  to  be  distinguished  from  the 
"disincentive"  effect  on  which  much  writing  has  focussed.  The  disincentive 
effect  arises  from  the  likelihood  that  an  increase  in  the  output  of  a  country 
in  overhang  will  lead  also  to  an  increase  in  its  debt  service.  Therefore,  the 
proceeds  of  domestic  investment  are  shared,  at  least  in  part,  with  foreign 
creditors.  In  principle,  this  acts  just  like  a  tax  on  investment,  decreasing 
the  social  return  to  domestic  investment.  However,  there  is  no  compelling 
conceptual  reason  to  believe  that  an  aggregate  "tax",  if  it  exists,  is 
internalized  in  private  investment  behavior:  from  the  perspective  of  an 
individual  investor,  the  aggregate  transfer  to  creditors  is  an  exogenous 
constant  which  is  unaffected  by  the  decisions  of  a  small  investor. 
Consequently,  even  if  the  social  disincentive  were  large,  the  private 
disincentive  would  still  be  small. 
The  empirical  importance  of  the  disincentive  effect  is  not  clear 
either.  For  one  thing,  both  the  average  and  marginal  tax  rates  implied  by 
debt  service  are  small:  net  transfers  to  creditors  rarely  exceed  4-5  percent 
of  GNP,  and  the  experience  after  1982  has  been  that  creditors  can  capture  only 
about  two  cents  out  of  any  dollar  increase  in  income  (see  table  3.  and  the 
discussion  in  Eaton,  1990).  In  fact,  there  is  no  empirical  evidence  in  cross- 
sectional  studies,  that  a  tax,  no  matter  how  small,  is  attached  to  the 
adjustment  effort  where  the  transfers  to  commercial,  creditors  is  concerned 
(see  table  3).  Single-country  investment  equations  (for  example,  Borensztein 
[1990]  on  the  Philippines,  Schmidt-Hebbel  [1989]  on  Brazil,  and  Morisset 
[1991]  on  Argentina)  and  panel  regressions  (e.g.  Ozler  and  Rodrik  [1991]) 
often  find  a  negative  relationship  between  indebtedness  and  investment.  But  it 
is  possible  that  such  results  are  driven  by  the  correlation  between  growing 
debt  and  declining  output  in  these  countries  in  the  198Os,  rather  than  by __..__1t..
-5-
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Hence,while the debt overhang is responsible for an investment
shortfall, this shortfall is not the product of an artificial reduction in
investment incentives but of a lack of liquidity.
(2) If the central proble Is lack of liquidity,Ianew money alone
sufficient? Why is debt reduction &lso needed to encourage new 1n'vestent?
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liquidity,calls for new money and renewed lending are inadequate. The reason
is that the overhang makes it impossible for countries to attract loans from
new groups of creditors. In the absence of seniority, new loans enter the
same pooi as old loans and instantly metamorphose into as poor an investment
as the old loans. Of course, these new loans may have led the country to
undertake the investments it was previously unable to, and perhaps would also
14.,.4....,.-..-, a-L..._0........I l.. _I_2_ CLSUILLLaLS LILt SJVCLILaLL& asLUeLLLtLOUL asiuni as cite uju ciasms scanu
undiminished,the new lenders will have to share the fruits of any improved
creditworthiness with the old lenders. This depresses the return to the
potential new lenders, and keeps them from doing business with the debtor
countries.
The consequence is that old creditors must provide debt relief in the
form of debt or debt service reduction (DDSR) before a new class of creditors
I_fill..,...— n..a £C ._L a! I-- nan jna A}J LICW UIUtIJZ%LLLL Li. cue new eLeujuors,sucn as cne iris, nave a
comparativeadvantage in eliciting the desired adjustments from governments,
debt reduction will actually be beneficial to the old creditors themselves.
In the presence of an overhang, therefore, both debt reduction and new money
are needed to elicit new investment.
This argument depends critically on the presunDtion that new lenders
-5- 
causality. 
Hence,  while  the  debt  overhang  is  responsible  for  an  investment 
shortfall,  this  shortfall  is  not  the  product  of  an  artificial  reduction  in 
investment  incentives  but  of  a  lack  of  liquidity. 
(2)  If  the  central  problem  is  lack  of  liquidity,  is  new  money  alone 
sufficient?  Uhy  is  debt  reduction  also  needed  to  encourage  new  investrent? 
Even  though  the  chief  inefficiency  caused  by  the  debt  overhang  is  lack  of 
liquidity,  calls  for  new  money  and  renewed  lending  are  inadequate.  The  reason 
is  that  the  overhang  makes  it  impossible  for  countries  to  attract  loans  from 
new  groups  of  creditors.  In  the  absence  of  seniority,  new  loans  enter  the 
same pool  as  old  loans  and  instantly  metamorphose  into  as  poor  an  investment 
as  the  old  loans.  Of  course,  these  new  loans  may  have  led  the  country  to 
undertake  the  investments  it  was  previously  unable  to,  and  perhaps  would  also 
eliminate  the  overhang  altogether.  But  as  long  as  the  old  claims  stand 
undiminished,  the  new  lenders  will  have  to  share  the  fruits  of  any  improved 
creditworthiness  with  the  old  lenders.  This  depresses  the  return  to  the 
potential  new  lenders,  and  keeps  them  from  doing  business  with  the  debtor 
countries. 
The  consequence  is  that  old  creditors  must  provide  debt  relief  in  the 
form  of  debt  or  debt  service  reduction  (DDSR)  before  a  new  class  of  creditors 
will  put  up  new  money.  And  if  the  new  creditors,  such  as  the  IFIs,  have  a 
comparative  advantage  in  eliciting  the  desired  adjustments  from  governments, 
debt  reduction  will  actually  be  beneficial  to  the  old  creditors  themselves. 
In  the  presence  of  an  overhang,  therefore,  both  debt  reduction  and  new  money 
are  needed  to  elicit  new  investment. 
This  argument  depends  critically  on  the  presumption  that  new  lenders -6-
cannot establish their seniority over existing claims. If lending by IFIs is
senior to commercial bank claims, as it is sometimes argued, then the argument
for debt reduction by commercial banks would have to rely on incentive effects
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creditors.Since we think the former has weak empirical basis, itiscrucial
for our argument that IFIs not be viewed as senior in the sense of a "me-
first" rule. For a good discussion of IFI seniority, the reader is referred
to recent papers by Bulow and Rogoff (1991) and Deniirguc-Kunt and Fernandez-
Arias (1991). Overall, both of these papers reach negative conclusions on IFI
seniority.
(3) WhyareIFIsneededto arrangeefficientdeals between creditors and
debtors? Whynotleave the banks and governments to york out their ovu
efficient debt agreements?
If IFIs did not provide something that commercial banks cannot, the case
so far would be for banks (i.e., the main old creditors) to provide an
appropriate new-money package to debtor governments such that the latter
nlranrhoracn,,rraeanti rho4nrpnt(vatn indortakp theanoronri ate
investments and adjustment. No DDSR would then be needed. Of course, banks
would have to overcome the free-rider problem, in so far as the dominant
strategy for an individual bank is to wait on the sidelines for others to put
in the new money. But if the efficiency gains are large, such coordination
problems can be overcome. Consequently, no new group of lenders would be
needed, and IFIs could stay out of the whole business. Indeed, in the view of
-.-' _.s_, a .-l-...-4.,1.,g g-l-ne, 1r An some ooservers otE lclai. inervenn 15 unnecessary'-'-
isto "leave private debt hanging' (Bulow and Rogoff, 1990).
However, there is an efficiency-enhancing role for IFIs to play, and this
-6- 
cannot  establish  their  seniority  over  existing  claims.  If  lending  by  IFIs  is 
senior  to  commercial  bank  claims,  as  it  is  sometimes  argued,  then  the  argument 
for  debt  reduction  by  commercial  banks  would  have  to  rely  on  incentive  effects 
for  the  debtor  rather  than  on  burden  sharing  between  the  two  types  of 
creditors.  Since  we  think  the  former  has  weak  empirical  basis,  it  is  crucial 
for  our  argument  that  IFIs  not  be  viewed  as  senior  in  the  sense  of  a  "me- 
first"  rule.  For  a  good  discussion  of  IF1  seniority,  the  reader  is  referred 
to  recent  papers  by  Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1991)  and  Demirguc-Kunt  and  Fernandez- 
Arias  (1991).  Overall,  both  of  these  papers  reach  negative  conclusions  on  IFI 
seniority. 
(3)  Vhy  are  IFIe  needed  to  arrange  efficient  deals  between  creditors  end 
debtors?  Vhy  not  leave  the  banks  end  governments  to  work  out  their  own 
efficient  debt  agreements? 
If  IFIs  did  not  provide  something  that  commercial  banks  cannot,  the  case 
so  far  would  be  for  banks  (i.e.,  the  main  old  creditors)  to  provide  an 
appropriate  new-money  package  to  debtor  governments  such  that  the  latter 
obtain  the  resources  and  the  incentive  to  undertake  the  appropriate 
investments  and  adjustment.  No  DDSR  would  then  be  needed.  Of  course,  banks 
would  have  to  overcome  the  free-rider  problem,  in  so  far  as  the  dominant 
strategy  for  an  individual  bank  is  to  wait  on  the  sidelines  for  others  to  put 
in  the  new  money.  But  if  the  efficiency  gains  are  large,  such  coordination 
problems  can  be  overcome.  Consequently,  no  new  group  of  lenders  would  be 
needed,  and  IFIs  could  stay  out  of  the  whole  business.  Indeed,  in  the  view  of 
some  observers  official  intervention  is  unnecessary,  and  the  right  thing  to  do 
is  to  "leave  private  debt  hanging"  (Bulow  and  Rogoff,  1990). 
However,  there  is  an  efficiency-enhancing  role  for  IFIs  to  play,  and  this -7-
r__,_ _l___ WtW _ __C____ t_____ ._t__ __________2_1 is grouneain two tunctions cnaliriscan petoruoecer cnan coiumetciai
banks. The first is conditionality. IFIs can make their disbursements
conditional on specific adjustments and policy reforms to be undertaken by the
debtor government. They have a better capacity to monitor that theagreed
measures are implemented, and are more acceptable to debtor governments.
Secondly. IFIs sinrnly know the debtor countries better. They have a better
sense of the costsof adjustment (andhence of the magnitude of new money
neee) afl or wretner governments WiLl, use tne new money ror investment or
for consumption. In more technical terms, they have a comparative advantage
in alleviating the asymmetric information that exists in the creditor-debtor
relationship. It goes without saying that in neither of these roles is the
performance of IFIs likely to be perfect. The point is simply that they are
better at conditionality and fact-finding than conxnerctal banks.
The practical consequence is that many mutually beneficial deals that
would not have been struck by banks and debtors alone become teasibte when
IFIs are involved. Now, since banks are likely to demand that IFIs put their
money where their mouth is, the appropriate role of IFIs involves a
combination of conditionality, dissemination of information, and provision
additioral loans.
(4) Why do debtor governents need conditionality to midertake reforms that
are gooebrthem?
One reason is that the presence of a debt overhang acts as a tax on
adjustment effort, just as it acts as a tax on investment. But as discussed
above, the practical significance of this is likely to be limited. Besides,
if a combination of DDSR and new money eliminates the overhang, the
disincentive for adi mer,t- ln
is  grounded  in  two  functions  that  IFIs  can  perform  better  than  commercial 
banks.  The  first  is  conditionality.  IFIs  can  make  their  disbursements 
conditional  on  specific  adjustments  and  policy  reforms  to  be  undertaken  by  the 
debtor  government.  They  have  a  better  capacity  to  monitor  that  the  agreed 
measures  are  implemented,  and  are  more  acceptable  to  debtor  governments. 
Secondly,  IFIs  simply  know  the  debtor  countries  better.  They  have  a  better 
sense  of  the  costs  of  adjustment  (and  hence  of  the  magnitude  of  new  money 
needed)  and  of  whether  governments  will  use  the  new  money  for  investment  or 
for  consumption.  In  more  technical  terms,  they  have  a  comparative  advantage 
in  alleviating  the  asymmetric  information  that  exists  in  the  creditor-debtor 
relationship.  It  goes  without  saying  that  in  neither  of  these  roles  is  the 
performance  of  IFIs  likely  to  be  perfect.  The  point  is  simply  that  they  are 
better  at  conditionality  and  fact-finding  than  commercial  banks. 
The  practical  consequence  is  that  many  mutually  beneficial  deals  that 
would  not  have  been  struck  by  banks  and  debtors  alone  become  feasible  when 
IFIs  are  involved.  Now,  since  banks  are  likely  to  demand  that  IFIs  put  their 
money  where  their  mouth  is,  the  appropriate  role  of  IFIs  involves  a 
combination  of  conditionality,  dissemination  of  information,  and  provision  -. 
additional  loans. 
(4)  Why  do  debtor  governments  need  ccmditicmali~  to  undertake  reforms  that 
are  good  for  then? 
One  reason  is  that  the  presence  of  a  debt  overhang  acts  as  a  tax  on 
adjustment  effort,  just  as  it  acts  as  a  tax  on  investment.  But  as  discussed 
above,  the  practical  significance  of  this  is  likely  to  be  limited.  Besides, 
if  a  combination  of  DDSR and  new  money  eliminates  the  overhang,  the 
disincentive  for  adjustment  disappears  also. -8-
The more important reason is that a liquidity constrained country is by
definition one in which it would be desirable to transfer resources from the
future to the present (at the tradeoff represented by the world interest
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downthe line, and would transfer income to the future rather than the
present. Therefore, a program that would be undertaken in the absence of a
liquidity constraint--i.e., a "worthwhile" program--will not necessarily be
undertaken unless there is sufficient external financing. Generally speaking,
there will be a level of external financing, call it L, at which a government
will choose to undertake adjustment even in the absence of conditionality.
Then there will be a lower level of financing'11t -- 0' — C'
governmentwould choose to adjust only if the financing is contingent on
adjustment--i.e., it there exists conditionality. If commercial banks can
come up withLbut not L, the countrywouldtake the money but not adjust.
Knowing that, banks are unlikely to lend L in the first place. Note the
debtor governznents time-inconsistency problem: it would be better off using
L for adjustment than not getting L*c at all, but once it has L it would
rather use the loan for consunrntion.
What conditionality buys in this instance is the commitment to adjust.
which the country is unable to provide on its ownforstandard credibility
reasons. Withconditionality,the banks and the country are potentially both
better off. For the debtor government, conditionality prevents the best from
being the enemy of the good.
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befngof debtor cotmtries?
As discussed above, there is a wide range of circumstances in which the
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The  more  important  reason  is  that  a  liquidity  constrained  country  is  by 
definition  one  in  which  it  would  be  desirable  to  transfer  resources  from  the 
future  to  the  present  (at  the  tradeoff  represented  by  the  world  interest 
rate).  A  typical  adjustment  program  would  entail  costs  upfront  and  benefits 
down  the  line,  and  would  transfer  income  to  the  future  rather  than  the 
present.  Therefore,  a  program  that  would  be  undertaken  in  the  absence  of  a 
lfquidity  constraint--i.e.,  a  "worthwhile"  program--will  not  necessarily  be 
undertaken  unless  there  is  sufficient  external  financing.  Generally  speaking, 
there  will  be  a  level  of  external  financing,  call  it  L'.  at  which  a  government 
will  choose  to  undertake  adjustment  even  in  the  absence  of  conditionality. 
Then  there  will  be  a  lower  level  of  financing,  call  it  L*,,  at  which  the 
government  would  choose  to  adjust  only  if  the  financing  is  contingent  on 
adjustment--i.e.,  if  there  exists  conditionality.  If  commercial  banks  can 
come  up  with  L*,  but  not  L*.  the  country  would  take  the  money  but  not  adjust. 
Knowing  that,  banks  are  unlikely  to  lend  L',  in  the  first  place.  Note  the 
debtor  government's  time-inconsistency  problem:  it  would  be  better  off  using 
L',  for  adjustment  than  not  getting  L*,  at  all,  but  once  it  has  L',  it  would 
rather  use  the  loan  for  consumption. 
What  conditionality  buys  in  this  instance  is  the  commitment  to  adjust, 
which  the  country  is  unable  to  provide  on  its  own  for  standard  credibility 
reasons.  With  conditionality,  the  banks  and  the  country  are  potentially  both 
better  off.  For  the  debtor  government,  conditionality  prevents  the  best  from 
being  the  enemy  of  the  good. 
(5)  How does  the  involvement  of  IFIs  affect  the  returns  to  banks  and  the  rell- 
be5.q  of  debtor  countries7 
As  discussed  above,  there  is  a  wide  range  of  circumstances  in  which  the -9-
involvement of IFIs can make both the debtor and the creditor banks,
collectively, better off. IFI conditionality buys the debtor credibility, and
that in turn makes the commercial banks willing to provide DDSR. There are
efficiency gains from this three-way exchange, and there exist many different
ways of splitting these gains among the commercial creditors, the debtor
.-1.T'T A,w ,Iivjn, hrwr t-hp thr .I&Ltt.SJ •
partiescan be achieved by an appropriate selection of: (i) the aiount of the
new loan received by the country (L) in return for adherence to an adjustment
program; (ii) the share of the new loan that is provided by each of the two
creditor groups; and (iii) the sharing--between the two creditor groups--of
the future repayment made by the country. The higher is L, the better off is
the country. The commercial banks are better off (and the IFIs worse off) when
3n.,l,e ka,at-t, acn liarekara mF I nrl ti-han thai, ant n inranr L_L aLLr. tta V C
share of the future repayment. Of course, the constraint that the banks, the
debtor, and the IFIs be at least as well off with a deal than without it limit
the range of combinations.
We will show that even when such efficiency enhancing packages are
implemented, such packages alone will not be sufficient to resolve the debt
overhang. Often, future debt service repayments will still be expected to fall
halnt, tha4 r rnnrror p., al rl l.al'ha aFFant t.rn ranrmant-c moAn ,ty tha .—nh,nt-r,, _7..'-'-".—J
will thus have to be divided in some manner between the different creditors.
Under equal seniority, the total debt repayment will be divided between
creditors on the basis of their share of total claims. In such a case, the new
credits to support adjustment cannot be expected to be fully repaid and the
benefit of the program will partially accrue to the old creditors.
E.ut the participation constraints limit the ways in which the net benefit
nft-knr.,..r.,,,, 1 _LIc pLJ5LalIILttaL £ Lilt £LICLCdt LII Lilt LULaS. 'JCUL 1JaJtIICIIL llILllJ 1_IIC
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involvement  of  IFIs  can  make  both  the  debtor  and  the  creditor  banks, 
collectively,  better  off.  IF1  conditionality  buys  the  debtor  credibility,  and 
that  in  turn  makes  the  commercial  banks  willing  to  provide  DDSR.  There  are 
efficiency  gains  from  this  three-way  exchange,  and  there  exist  many  different 
ways  of  splitting  these  gains  among  the  commercial  creditors,  the  debtor 
country,  and  the  IFIs  themselves.  Any  desired  division  between  the  three 
parties  can  be  achieved  by  an  appropriate  selection  of:  (i)  the  amount  of  the 
new  loan  received  by  the  country  (L)  in  return  for  adherence  to  an  adjustment 
program;  (ii)  the  share  of  the  new  loan  that  is  provided  by  each  of  the  two 
creditor  groups;  and  (iii)  the  sharing--between  the  two  creditor  groups--of 
the  future  repayment  made  by  the  country.  The  higher  is  L.  the  better  off  is 
the  country.  The  commercial  banks  are  better  off  (and  the  IFIs  worse  off)  when 
the  banks  have  to  provide  a  smaller  share  of  L  and  when  they  get  a  larger 
share  of  the  future  repayment.  Of  course,  the  constraint  that  the  banks,  the 
debtor,  and  the  IFIs  be  at  least  as  well  off  with  a  deal  than  without  it  limit 
the  range  of  combinations. 
We  will  show  that  even  when  such  efficiency  enhancing  packages  are 
implemented,  such  packages  alone  will  not  be  sufficient  to  resolve  the  debt 
overhang.  Often,  future  debt  service  repayments  will  still  be  expected  to  fall 
below  their  contractual  value.  The  effective  repayments  made  by  the  country 
will  thus  have  to  be  divided  in  some  manner  between  the  different  creditors. 
Under  equal  seniority,  the  total  debt  repayment  will  be  divided  between 
creditors  on  the  basis  of  their  share  of  total  claims.  In  such  a  case,  the  new 
credits  to  support  adjustment  cannot  be  expected  to  be  fully  repaid  and  the 
benefit  of  the  program  will  partially  accrue  to  the  old  creditors. 
But  the  participation  constraints  limit  the  ways  in  which  the  net  benefit 
of  the  program--that  is,  the  increase  in  the  total  debt  payments  minus  the -10-
loss on the loans that need to be provided to support adjustment- -isdivided
between the commercial banks and the IFIs. Any particular sharing of the cost
between the two creditor groups can be achieved by varying the shares of their
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varyingthe shares intotaldebt of each groups debt claims.
Whn theIFIs have no prior exposure to the debtor country, but are
expected to provide new money to support an adjustment program, the banks must
provide enough debt relief to return the country to creditworthiness and allow
the IFIs to make a "normal" return on their investment. ut when the IFIs have
some prior exposure to the country, adjustment lending also improves the IFIs'
414.-.. a .-.pllap.t- an rl..atr alA Aahtc 'fl.4e rarI,It,a., rha ann.,nr ff ml 4nF t+nt- aIJsa.J..J '..'.FJ.
needsto be offered by banks. As a result, however, there is no conpel1ing
reason to return the country to creditworthiness. Indeed, if the debt overhang
were to be eliminated, the IFIs would get a normal return on their new old
loans, while the banks would only get a normal return on the part of their
debt that had not been forgiven. While this may still be a situation
preferable to that without adjustment, the banks may insist on a fairer
el..nInn.,,F rha nap na(nc 4. ._tL
Asa benchmark, it is useful to consider a proportional distribution rule
(PDR), where the net gains are divided between the creditors proportionally to
their initial exposure. For reasons stated above, the PDR is inconipatible
with the complete elimination of the overhang as long as (i) IFIs do not
provide debt reduction, and (ii) IFIs have prior exposure to the problem
debtor. Since both conditions hold in practice, a rule such as PDR
intereteres WLtfl return to crecLtworcnlness.
To the extent that the IFIs can claim that the net benefits of the
program derive from their ownactions(i.e. the provision of conditionality),
-lO- 
loss  on  the  loans  that  need  to  be  provided  to  support  adjustment--is  divided 
between  the  commercial  banks  and  the  1FI.s.  Any  particular  sharing  of  the  cost 
between  the  two  creditor  groups  can  be  achieved  by  varying  the  shares  of  their 
new  money  contribution.  And  the  sharing  in  the  benefit  can  be  altered  by 
varying  the  shares  in  total  debt  of  each  group's  debt  claims. 
When the  IFIs  have  no  prior  exposure  to  the  debtor  country,  but  are 
expected  to  provide  new  money  to  support  an  adjustment  program,  the  banks  must 
provide  enough  debt  relief  to  return  the  country  to  creditworthiness  and  allow 
the  IFIs  to  make  a  "normal"  return  on  their  investment.  But  when  the  IFIs  have 
some prior  exposure  to  the  country,  adjustment  lending  also  improves  the  IFIs' 
ability  to  collect  on  their  old  debts.  This  reduces  the  amount  of  relief  that 
needs  to  be  offered  by  banks.  As  a  result,  however,  there  is  no  compelling 
reason  to  return  the  country  to  creditworthiness.  Indeed,  if  the  debt  overhang 
were  to  be  eliminated,  the  IFIs  would  get  a  normal  return  on  their  new  &  old 
loans,  while  the  banks  would  only  get  a  normal  return  on  the  part  of  their 
debt  that  had  not  been  forgiven.  While  this  may  still  be  a  situation 
preferable  to  that  without  adjustment,  the  banks  may  insist  on  a  fairer 
sharing  of  the  net  gains. 
As  a  benchmark,  it  is  useful  to  consider  a  proportional  distribution  rule 
(PW,  where  the  net  gains  are  divided  between  the  creditors  proportionally  to 
their  initial  exposure.  For  reasons  stated  above,  the  PDR is  incompatible 
with  the  complete  elimination  of  the  overhang  as  long  as  (i)  IFIs  do  not 
provide  debt  reduction,  and  (ii)  IFIs  have  prior  exposure  to  the  problem 
debtor.  Since  both  conditions  hold  in  practice,  a  rule  such  as  PDR 
intereferes  with  return  to  creditworthiness. 
To  the  extent  that  the  IFIs  can  claim  that  the  net  benefits  of  the 
program  derive  from  their  own  actions  (i.e.,  the  provision  of  conditionality), -11-
they may demand that the banics grant more aeDt reilet trian that tmpi1e by the
PDR. But to the extent that banks can bargain harder by threatening to delay
the program, and to the extent that IFIs' loans enjoy a preferential treatment
by the creditors, less debt relief will be forthcoming.
The same considerations apply when debt relief is provided by the banks
throuvh buvback (rather than cure debt reliefl. Buvbacks allow banks to cash0
inpart of their share of the net benefit of the program early on. Under the
PDR rule, the Larger the exit price, the more 00 ancs neee to give up ruture
repayments, and thus, the larger the needed debt reduction.
(6) flowis burden sharing accop1ished under the Brady Plan?
While the Baker plan stressed the need to increase financial support,
esnecially from the IFIs. it was clear by 1989 that new loans from commercial
sources had dried up. Net transfers from the SIMICs' to the commercial banks
stood at over ].5 billion for a sixth year in a row. Possibly as a reaction to
the unfavorable sharing of the burden, the IFIs also decreased their lending
activities to the highly indebted countries, with net transfers becoming
negative starting in 1987 (see table 2).
The grady plan stressed the need for debt reduction by commercial banks
inthennnrevrtiff adiictn,pntnrnurnmc byrhn IVtcItlcn rnrnen4?d —
thediversity of interests that characterized the banking community, still
adjusting to the interest rate shock of the early 1980s and adapting to
increased competition from less regulated financial institutions. The Plan
'Severely Indebted Middle Income Countries. See table 1 for a list.
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thay  may  demand  that  the  banks  grant  more  debt  relief  than  that  implied  by  the 
PDR.  But  to  the  extent  that  banks  can  bargain  harder  by  threatening  to  delay 
the  program,  and  to  the  extent  that  IFIs'  loans  enjoy  a  preferential  treatment 
by  the  creditors,  less  debt  relief  will  be  forthcoming. 
The  same  considerations  apply  when  debt  relief  is  provided  by  the  banks 
through  buybacks  (rather  than  pure  debt  relief).  Buybacks  allow  banks  to  cash 
in  part  of  their  share  of  the  net  benefit  of  the  program  early  on.  Under  the 
PDR  rule,  the  larger  the  exit  price,  the  more  do  banks  need  to  give  up  future 
repayments,  and  thus,  the  larger  the  needed  debt  reduction. 
(6)  Bow  IS  burden  sharing  accomplished  under  the  Brady  Plan? 
While  the  Baker  plan  stressed  the  need  to  increase  financial  support, 
especially  from  the  IFIs,  it  was  clear  by  1989  that  new  loans  from  commercial 
sources  had  dried  up.  Net  transfers  from  the  SIMICs'  to  the  commercial  banks 
stood  at  over  $15  billion  for  a  sixth  year  in  a  row.  Possibly  as  a  reaction  to 
the  unfavorable  sharing  of  the  burden,  the  IFIs  also  decreased  their  lending 
activities  to  the  highly  indebted  countries,  with  net  transfers  becoming 
negative  starting  in  1987  (see  table  2). 
The  Brady  plan  stressed  the  need  for  debt  reduction  by  commercial  banks 
in  the  context  of  adjustment  programs  funded  by  the  IFIs.  It  also  recognized 
the  diversity  of  interests  that  characterized  the  banking  community,  still 
adjusting  to  the  interest  rate  shock  of  the  early  1980s  and  adapting  to 
increased  competition  from  less  regulated  financial  institutions.  The  Plan 
'Severely  Indebted  Middle  Income  Countries.  See  table  1  for  a  list. -12-
stressed market based deals, using the emerging menu approach to debt
rescheduling to allow for diverse responses by banks.
If debt is repurchased on thesecondarymarket, the price that must be
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such a mechanism, the exiting banks would not have to share the burden of
financing adjustment. As a result, deals with "fair" burden sharing (e.g. with
PDR) cannot rely on market buybacks to achieve the desired debt reduction.
Rather, concerted debt reductions need to be worked Out to overcome this
coordination failure. Ideally, each creditor bank would sell a specific share
of its claims at a price below the expected ex-post price. But in practice, it
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principallybecause of the heterogeneity within the banks' group. If creditors
differ with respect to their own relative valuation of country debt, a
concerted buyback that does not discriminate between banks and that at the
same time hurts no bank must occur at the reservation price of the bank with
the highest valuation. On this score, the market mechanism is more efficient
in that it allows creditors to self-select, with only those with low valuation
-,,,- a. A. 4_LL a i.. a as_4.Asas.JA_acl.
Therecent Brady deals have focused on a menu of options from which the
creditors will select later. By combining concerted and voluntary
characteristics, the menu approach to debt reduction retains the advantages,
but not the inconveniences, of pure market and pure concerted mechanisms
described above. The options on the menu and their relative pricing are first
negotiated; in a second round, each creditor freely chooses his preferred
- -. - •1 I .1 _t___ I optton. Uvera1i tfle elseriminatton ariowea Dy tile menu ajiows LO1IaLgL
actualrelief, for a given willingness of banks to offer relief.
For a menu of options to allow different creditors to choose different
-12- 
stressed  market  based  deals,  using  the  emerging  menu  approach  to  debt 
rescheduling  to  allow  for  diverse  responses  by  banks. 
If  debt  is  repurchased  on  the  secondary  market,  the  price  that  must  be 
paid  is  the  equilibrium  price  of  debt  claims  after  the  debt  reduction.  Under 
such  a  mechanism,  the  exiting  banks  would  not  have  to  share  the  burden  of 
financing  adjustment.  As  a  result,  deals  with  "fair"  burden  sharing  (e.g.  with 
PDR)  cannot  rely  on  market  buybacks  to  achieve  the  desired  debt  reduction. 
Rather,  concerted  debt  reductions  need  to  be  worked  out  to  overcome  this 
coordination  failure.  Ideally,  each  creditor  bank  would  sell  a  specific  share 
of  its  claims  at  a  price  below  the  expected  ex-post  price.  But  in  practice,  it 
may  prove  difficult  to  achieve  much  debt  reduction  in  such  a  manner, 
principally  because  of  the  heterogeneity  within  the  banks'  group.  If  creditors 
differ  with  respect  to  their  own  relative  valuation  of  country  debt,  a 
concerted  buyback  that  does  not  discriminate  between  banks  and  that  at  the 
same  time  hurts  no  bank  must  occur  at  the  reservation  price  of  the  bank  with 
the  highest  valuation.  On  this  score,  the  market  mechanism  is  more  efficient 
in  that  it  allows  creditors  to  self-select,  with  only  those  with  low  valuation 
selling  out  at  a  particular  offer  price. 
The  recent  Brady  deals  have  focused  on  a  menu  of  options  from  which  the 
creditors  will  select  later.  By  combining  concerted  and  voluntary 
characteristics,  the  menu  approach  to  debt  reduction  retains  the  advantages, 
but  not  the  inconveniences,  of  pure  market  and  pure  concerted  mechanisms 
described  above.  The  options  on  the  menu  and  their  relative  pricing  are  first 
negotiated;  in  a  second  round,  each  creditor  freely  chooses  his  preferred 
option.  Overall,  the  discrimination  allowed  by  the  menu  allows  for  larger 
actual  relief,  for  a  given  willingness  of  banks  to  offer  relief. 
For  a  menu  of  options  to  allow  different  creditors  to  choose  different -13-
options voluntarily, the value of all options must be comparable. This works
out mechanically when the menu includes exit and relending options, because
each of these options becomes more valuable as the other option is picked by
too many banks. In equilibrium, all options will have comparable values.
If the IFIs are treated symmetrically with the banks that choose to offer
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alsoobey the proportional distribution rule. But only the menus with a
particular exit price (the "fair" price, r) will raise sufficient liquidity to
support the adjustment program. On the other hand, the sharing of the net
cost of the program among all creditors will not be proportional if the IFIs'
new money contribution is relatively larger than that of banks that chose to
relend and remain exposed to the debtor country.
In the following, we will discuss and illustrate these points using an
analytical framework. Our starting point is the problem faced by a government
with a debt overhang which has to choose whether to undertake an adjustment
program or not. Adjustment has the potential of eliminating the overhang,
but, in the absence of external financing, the immediate costs would be too
high relative to future benefits. We then look at the set of strategies
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thebanks and the country could work out by themselves. Next, we introduce
conditionality on the part of IFIs and analyze the enlarged set of deals that
this makes possible. Finally, we look at various strategies for dividing the




0ptions  voluntarily,  the  value  of  all  options  must  be  comparable.  This  works 
out  mechanically  when  the  menu  includes  exit  and  relending  options,  because 
each  of  these  options  becomes  more  valuable  as  the  other  option  is  picked  by 
too  many  banks.  In  equilibrium,  all  options  will  have  comparable  values. 
If  the  IFIs  are  treated  symmetrically  with  the  banks  that  choose  to  offer 
new  money,  any  menu  of  options  that  includes  exit  and  relending  options  will 
also  obey  the  proportional  distribution  rule.  But  only  the  menus  with  a 
particular  exit  price  (the  "fair"  price,  r)  will  raise  sufficient  liquidity  to 
support  the  adjustment  program.  On  the  other  hand,  the  sharing  of  the  net 
cost  of  the  program  among  all  creditors  will  not  be  proportional  if  the  IFIs' 
new  money  contribution  is  relatively  larger  than  that  of  banks  that  chose  to 
relend  and  remain  exposed  to  the  debtor  country. 
In  the  following,  we  will  discuss  and  illustrate  these  points  using  an 
analytical  framework.  Our  starting  point  is  the  problem  faced  by  a  government 
with  a  debt  overhang  which  has  to  choose  whether  to  undertake  an  adjustment 
program  or  not.  Adjustment  has  the  potential  of  eliminating  the  overhang, 
but,  in  the  absence  of  external  financing,  the  immediate  costs  would  be  too 
high  relative  to  future  benefits.  We  then  look  at  the  set  of  strategies 
available  to  commercial  banks  and  characterize  the  types  of  arrangements  that 
the  banks  and  the  country  could  work  out  by  themselves.  Next.  we  introduce 
conditionality  on  the  part  of  IFIs,  and  analyze  the  enlarged  set  of  deals  that 
this  makes  possible.  Finally,  we  look  at  various  strategies  for  dividing  the 
efficiency  gains  among  the  IFIs,  commercial  banks,  and  the  debtor  under  Brady- 
type  deals. 
II  The  Adjustment  Decision -14-
There are two key features in the way we view adjustment policies
followed by debtor countries. The first, for analytical convenience mostly,
is that adjustment is an all-or-nothing affair. Governments either choose to
..A4..-.-%......4.,'f-flt1e ttllac nest r1-ancc4h411ttr t,h4rl, nnrtnI.. .4.,. CLLJ Ua I.. J A. LLLCJ !.A# t t A. it "LI SttI 'I_CL 1.10 A. IL A.
inreality, that a varying amount of adjustment effort may be exerted
depending on the circumstances. However, since we will view the adjustment
decision as the consequence of rational cost-benefit calculus, treating the
decision as a binary one has also some practical benefits. For one thing, it
leads to more realism than the smooth case in which the marginal costs and
benefits of adjustment effort are continuously balanced, and the country gains
.,att, a—— .4, t--1-ha an,,'nl nna t-honran, —— frrsn, an4nrraa ca in a A4,1CtClDnt ttJ .tI4.LI __&Iatta
inducedby a change in, say, external lending. -Moreover,this formulation
allows us to downplay the 'adjustment tax" aspect of the debt overhang, which
as we argued in the preceding section has little empirical content.
The second feature, which is critical to the story that follows, is that
adjustment requires incurring some fixed costs upfront. The benefits of
adjustment come not immediately, but over time; in the context of a two-period
n,,eialrhatynrrNra in rh carnnd normA T1n{s4cr1ictir cnert tf ract
policy reforms. On the stabilization front, any program that works is likely
to be recessionary in the short run. With respect to structural reforms, they
too typically create costs in the short run, either economic or political. It
is this feature which makes adjustment programs formally identical to
investment: in each case, a cost is incurred to reap a reward in the future.
For example, the countries that have undertaken adjustment programs with
C___r..r' J ..L_ r,_.la D,. ..1 c 1 £ILLtLIS.LVt SUULL LLUUI CLIt mr dliii Lilt WULLUodlir LidVe uUL WIavC&a5
percentof output in the first year of the program, 4.7 percent in the second
year, and 2 percent in the third year (see table 4). While these estimates
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There  are  two  key  features  in  the  way  we  view  adjustment  policies 
followed  by  debtor  countries.  The  first,  for  analytical  convenience  mostly, 
is  that  adjustment  is  an  all-or-nothing  affair.  Governments  either  choose  to 
adjust  or  they  don't.  This  rules  out  the  possibility,  which  certainly  exists 
in  reality,  that  a  varying  amount  of  adjustment  effort  may  be  exerted 
depending  on  the  circumstances.  However,  since  we  will  view  the  adjustment 
decision  as  the  consequence  of  rational  cost-benefit  calculus,  treatLng  the 
decision  as  a  binary  one  has  also  some  practical  benefits.  For  one  thing,  it 
leads  to  more  realism  than  the  smooth  case  in  which  the  marginal  costs  and 
benefits  of  adjustment  effort  are  continuously  balanced,  and  the  country  gains 
nothing--thanks  to  the  envelope  theorem--from  an  increase  in  adjustment 
induced  by  a  change  in,  say,  external  lending.  -Moreover,  this  formulation 
allows  us  to  downplay  the  "adjustment  tax"  aspect  of  the  debt  overhang,  which 
as  we  argued  in  the  preceding  section  has  little  empirical  content. 
The  second  feature,  which  is  critical  to  the  story  that  follows,  is  that 
adjustment  requires  incurring  some  fixed  costs  upfront.  The  benefits  of 
adjustment  come  not  immediately,  but  over  time;  in  the  context  of  a  two-period 
model,  they  arrive  in  the  second  period.  This  is  a  realistic  aspect  of  most 
policy  reforms.  On  the  stabilization  front,  any  program  that  works  is  likely 
to  be  recessionary  in  the  short  run.  With  respect  to  structural  reforms,  they 
too  typically  create  costs  in  the  short  run,  either  economic  or  political.  It 
is  this  feature  which  makes  adjustment  programs  formally  identical  to 
investment:  in  each  case,  a  cost  is  incurred  to  reap  a  reward  in  the  future. 
For  example,  the  countries  that  have  undertaken  adjustment  programs  with 
intensive  support  from  the  IMF  and  the  World  Bank  have  lost  on  average  5.1 
percent  of  output  in  the  first  year  of  the  program,  4.7  percent  in  the  second 
year,  and  2  percent  in  the  third  year  (see  table  4).  While  these  estimates -15-
correct for trend growth and terms of trade shocks, they should be taken with
a grain of salt. On the one hand, they are biased upward since these countries
would have lost growth opportunities by not adjusting. Indeed, output fell by
an average of 3.1 percent in the year prior to theadjustmentprozram. and 2.4
percent two years before the beginning of adjustment. But on the other hand,
it is 1teiy that countries trLat ajust are those where aJustInent costs are
the lowest. The selection bias is thus likely to lower these estitnates.
The government starts out with an inherited debt which carries a face
value of D.En period zero, it is offered a package from the commercial
banks, which consists of debt reduction of amount B and new loans of amount L.
In th nextctinn.j11lnnkmc,rrlnplvt-t-h hank'rn-t-v 1-n
offer some debt relief; for the moment, we take B and L as given. On the
basis of this package, the government decides whether to undertake an
adjustment program or not. Adjustment "costs" a fixed amount K in period
zero, but increases output from '1 to Y(1+8) in period one. The government
enters period one with an existing stock of debt amounting toR[D-B÷L,where
R is one plus the world interest rate. If it fails to repay the debt in full.
LU penaieL[1countryoy a traccion, Q,OL output.me
presence of an overhang is ensured by assuming that the country would never
choose to repay the debt in full in the absence of adjustment and/or debt
reduction, i.e. RD >Y.
The government seeks to maximize a welfare function where second-period
utilityis1irr r, - —
(1)Max W —U(C0)+
f Y+LK, if adjust s.t. C0 —-l
I —— I 1- uc[lerwtse.
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correct  for  trend  growth  and  terms  of  trade  shocks,  they  should  be  taken  with 
a  grain  of  salt.  On  the  one  hand,  they  are  biased  upward  since  these  countries 
would  have  lost  growth  opportunities  by  not  adjusting.  Indeed,  output  fell  by 
an  average  of  3.1  percent  in  the  year  prior  to  the  adjustment  program,  and  2.4 
percent  two  years  before  the  beginning  of  adjustment.  But  on  the  other  hand, 
it  is  likely  that  countries  that  ajust  are  those  where  adjustment  costs  are 
the  lowest.  The  selection  bias  is  thus  likely  to  lower  these  estimates. 
The  government  starts  out  with  an  inherited  debt  which  carries  a  face 
value  of  D.  In  period  zero,  it  is  offered  a  package  from  the  commercial 
banks,  which  consists  of  debt  reduction  of  amount  B  and  new  loans  of  amount  L. 
In  the  next  section,  we will  look  more  closely  at  the  banks'  incentive  to 
offer  some debt  relief;  for  the  moment,  we  take  B  and  L  as  given.  On  the 
basis  of  this  package,  the  government  decides  whether  to  undertake  an 
adjustment  program  or  not.  Adjustment  "costs"  a  fixed  amount  K  in  period 
zero,  but  increases  output  from  Y  to  Y(l+B)  in  period  one.  The  government 
enters  period  one  with  an  existing  stock  of  debt  amounting  to  R[D-B+L],  where 
R  is  one  plus  the  world  interest  rate.  If  it  fails  to  repay  the  debt  in  full, 
creditors  are  able  to  penalize  the  country  by  a  fraction,  o,  of  output.  The 
presence  of  an  overhang  is  ensured  by  assuming  that  the  country  would  never 
choose  to  repay  the  debt  in  full  in  the  absence  of  adjustment  and/or  debt 
reduction,  i.e.  RD >  oY. 
The  government  seeks  to  maximize  a  welfare  function  where  second-period 
utility  is  linear  in  consumption: 
(1)  Max  U -  U(C,)  +  PC, 
-i 
(Y+L-K,  if  adjust 
s.t.  c, 
I  y  +  L,  otherwise. -16-
(Y(1+6)R[D-8+L], (1-a)Y(1+8)) if adjust
C' —
max(YR[D-E+L],(1-a)Y), otherwise.
Note that for completeness we have allowed for the possibility that the
overhang may be eliminated even in the absence of adjustment (thanks to a
large enough B). even though banks will have no incentive to provide DDSR in
such a case. In what follows, we will assunie that the government remains
—______,_____, s__ _1, ___1 — creoi racioneu in au reievan cases 50 LU i views increases in i.. as
always desirable. This is guaranteed by assuming U >Rthroughout. Note
that commercial banks have no control over what the government chooses to do
with L. So they cannot make the provision of L (or B) contingent on that
choice. This is reflected above in that C0 equals '1 +Lrather than Y when
the governznent chooses fltoadlust. Once the loan is provided, the
government simply chooses whatever is good for itself. Under conditional
£eno.3.ng (a.scussea beLow), the government woui be rorce to adjustwheneverL
> 0.
Substituting for C0 and C in the maximand, we can express the
government's decision rule as follows:
(2)Adjust if: IJ(Y +L-K)+ max (Y(1+8) -R[D-B+L),(1-)Y(1+$))
tJ(Y +L)+fi max('1-R[D-B-*-L],(1-a)?)
s Efl].S maes cLear, tne nec oeneti.cs or aejustinent are sensitive to wnetner
the debt overhang is eliminatedin period one or not. If it is, consumption
in period one becomes Y(1-,-8) -R[D--i-L)or Y-R[D-B+L]If the overhang
continues, consumption in period one is independent of both L and B, and
equals (1-)Y(1+e) or (l-a)Y. The cost-benefit calculus therefore shows
different oronerties denendn on the overhan' srarus. 0 -
-16- 
(  max  (Y(l+B) 
c1  -  'I  max  (Y 
-  R[D-B+L],  (1-a)Y(l+B)),  if  adjust 
-  R[D-B+L],  (1-ct)Y),  otherwise. 
Note  that  for  completeness  we  have  allowed  for  the  possibility  that  the 
overhang  may  be  eliminated  even  in  the  absence  of  adjustment  (thanks  to  a 
large  enough  B),  eve"  though  banks  will  have  no  incentive  to  provide  DDSR  in 
such  a  case.  In  what  follows,  we  will  assume  that  the  government  remains 
credit  rationed  in  all  relevant  cases,  so  that  it  views  increases  in  L  as 
always  desirable.  This  is  guaranteed  by  assuming  U'  >  ,9R  throughout.  Note 
that  commercial  banks  have  no  control  over  what  the  government  chooses  to  do 
with  L.  So  they  cannot  make  the  provision  of  L  (or  B)  contingent  on  that 
choice.  This  is  reflected  above  in  that  C,  equals  Y  +  L  rather  than  Y  when 
the  government  chooses  a  to  adjust.  Once  the  loan  is  provided,  the 
government  simply  chooses  whatever  is  good  for  itself.  Under  conditional 
lending  (discussed  below),  the  government  would  be  forced  to  adjust  whenever  L 
>  0. 
Substituting  for  C,  and  C,  in  the  maximand,  we  can  express  the 
government's  decision  rule  as  follows: 
(2)  Adjust  if:  U(Y  +  L  -  K)  +  fi  max  (Y(l+B)  -  R(D-B+L],  (1-o)Y(l+B)) 
t  U(Y  +  L)  +  ~3 max  (Y  -  R(D-B+L],  (1-a)Y) 
As  this  makes  clear,  the  net  benefits  of  adjustment  are  sensitive  to  whether 
the  debt  overhang  is  eliminated  in  period  one  or  not.  If  it  is,  co"sumptio" 
in  period  one  becomes  Y(l+B)  -  R[D-B+L]  or  Y  -  R[D-B+L].  If  the  overhang 
continues,  consumption  in  period  one  is  independent  of  both  L  and  B,  and 
equals  (1-a)Y(l+B)  or  (l-a)Y.  The  cost-benefit  calculus  therefore  shows 
different  properties  depending  on  the  overhang  status. -17-
There are four possibilities for the outcome in period one, eacfl of which
describes a different zone in (B,L) space:
Zone I: no adjustment, no overhang;
Zone II: adjustment, no overhang;
Zone III: adjustment, overhang;
7.-,.,nii, •,,r ne14sictnont nuArhna £I_ C J.• •• —— • — — ••••b
Foreach combination ofand L, the government's adjustment decision puts us
in one of these four zones. These zones are depicted in Figure 1.
To see how we get these zones, consider first the demarcation between
overhang and no-overhang zones. This demarcation is defined by the
combinations of B and L that leave the government indifferent between repaying
the debt in full and paying the penalty (a times output). Hence it is
Ancrr4hAdhi.r tha Fn1lnw4n nn,,,tjnnc —
R(D-B+L]—aY(1+9),when adjusting
and R[D-B+L] —a?, when not adjusting.
Note that these are two 45-degree lines, with the first being the relevant one
in zones II and III, and the second the relevant one inzonesI and IV. They
capture the following simple intuitions. First, when the government is just
short of dfu1t a, ddtiôr1 io11r of ,,, h t-n h nfft- hv n — ..—-
additionaldollar of debt reduction to keep the government from crossing over.
Second, when the government chooses to adjust (and output rises to Y(1+8)),
the no-overhang region becomes larger and the overhang region smaller.
Turn now to the loci that separate the adjustment zones from the no-
adjustment zones. The relevant locus is easy to describe when an overhang
prevails. Here we have the equality
-17- 
There  are  four  possibilities  for  the  outcome  in  period  one,  each  of  which 
describes  a  different  zone  in  (B,L)  Space: 
Zone  I:  no  adjustment,  no  overhang; 
Zone  II:  adjustment,  no  overhang; 
zone  III:  adjustment,  overhang; 
Zone  IV:  no  adjustment,  overhang. 
For  each  combination  of  B  and  L,  the  government's  adjustment  decision  puts  us 
in  one  of  these  four  zones.  These  zones  are  depicted  in  Figure  1. 
To  see  how  we  get  these  zones.  consider  first  the  demarcation  between 
overhang  and  no-overhang  zones.  This  demarcation  is  defined  by  the 
combinations  of  B  and  L  that  leave  the  government  indifferent  between  repaying 
the  debt  in  full  and  paying  the  penalty  (~1 times  output).  Hence  it  is 
described  by  the  following  equations: 
R(D-B+L]  -  aY(l+B).  when  adjusting 
and  R[D-B+L]  -  aY,  when  not  adjusting. 
Note  that  these  are  two  45-degree  lines,  with  the  first  being  the  relevant  one 
in  zones  II  and  III,  and  the  second  the  relevant  one  in  zones  I  and  IV.  n=Y 
capture  the  following  simple  intuitions.  First,  when  the  government  is  just 
short  of  default,  an  additional  dollar  of  new  lending  has  to  be  offset  by  an 
additional  dollar  of  debt  reduction  to  keep  the  government  from  crossing  over. 
Second,  when  the  government  chooses  to  adjust  (and  output  rises  to  Y(l+B)), 
the  no-overhang  region  becomes  larger  and  the  overhang  region  smaller. 
Turn  now  to  the  loci  that  separate  the  adjustment  zones  from  the  no- 
adjustment  zones.  The  relevant  locus  is  easy  to  describe  when  an  overhang 




This defines implicitly a level of L, L, which makes this equality hold.
When the country remains in overhang. the government will choose tüdiuct for - J - - 'a
- —
allL greater or equal to L. L* can be written as a function of the various
parameters in (3):
(4)L* —L(cr,6, ,K).
It can be checked that the minimumloanneeded to make the government choose
adjustment (when overhang continues) is increasing in a and K, and decreasing
inand 9 (as long as U' < 0). These are intuitively appealing results.
Note moreover that L does not depend on B, as the face value of the inherited
debt stock is of no consequence as long as overhang prevails. Therefore, the
__ uemarcaon oeween zones j.j.j.aniv aujusment aria no-aaJusment zones, Docn
in overhang) is a perfectly vertical line as shownin Figure 1.
The corresponding locus in the absence of overhang is more tricky.
Consider the situation where the government would be in overhang if it did not








When equation (5) holds as an equality, it defines a schedule along which the
-18- 
U(Y  +  L  -  K)  +  fl(l-a)Y(l+B)  -  U(Y  +  L)  +  B(l-o)Y, 
or: 
(3)  U(Y  +  L)  -  U(Y  +  L  -  K)  -  &l(l-a)BY. 
This  defines  implicitly  a  level  of  L,  L*,  which  makes  this  equality  hold. 
When  the  country  remains  in  overhang,  the  government  will  choose  to  adjust  for 
all  L  greater  or  equal  to  L*.  L'  can  be  written  as  a  function  of  the  various 
parameters  in  (3): 
+  -  -  + 
(4)  L*  -  L*(o.  8,  /9,  K). 
It  can  be  checked  that  the  minimum  loan  needed  to  make  the  government  choose 
adjustment  (when  overhang  continues)  is  increasing  in  o  and  K,  and  decreasing 
in  ,3  and  8  (as  long  as  U"  <  0).  These  are  intuitively  appealing  results. 
Note  moreover  that  L*  does  not  depend  on  B,  as  the  face  value  of  the  inherited 
debt  stock  is  of  no  consequence  as  long  as  overhang  prevails.  Therefore,  the 
demarcation  between  zones  III  and  IV  (adjustment  and  no-adjustment  zones,  both 
in  overhang)  is  a  perfectly  vertical  lfne  as  shown  in  Figure  1. 
The  corresponding  locus  in  the  absence  of  overhang  is  more  tricky. 
Consider  the  situation  where  the  government  would  be  in  overhang  if  it  did  not 
adjust,  the  relevant  case  for  much  of  the  subsequent  discussion.  Now 
adjustment  requires 
U(Y  +  L  -  K)  +  p(Y(l+B)  -  R[D-B+L]) 
t  U(Y  +  L)  +  /?(l-o)Y, 
or: 
(5)  U(Y  +  L)  -  U(Y  +  L  -  K)  +  R[D-B+L]  5  (a  +  B)pY. 
When  equation  (5)  holds  as  an  equality,  it  defines  a  schedule  along  which  the -19-
- -— z_ SCC...-,.._.- ....,A ..-
gOVernitenc remainsLLLULLLCL cli L. c LWCCLICSjA.a a&L. lflJ •a.aJ..Ao1.115. S LIC
relationbetween Land B along this schedule is given by:
(6) dL/dB —I-(8R'[U(Y+L-K)-U(Y+
which is of ambiguous sign since the expression in the square brackets is
positive as long as U" <0.
The explanationfor the ambiguity is as follows. A dollar increase in B
— ,___r2_ C a_:__ l_.. an _3_11___ increases tile nec Deneilu £LUIU auJusc.Lttg u)l pr UUL.LdLb LLtCe LLLLb LbLILt
discounted present value of the increase in second period consumption when
adjusting). Should L be increased or decreased to offset the added incentive
to adjust? Now an increase in L would reduce the benefit of adjusting to the
extent that the discounted second period consumption would fall. (Since
overhang prevails when not adjusting, L does not affect consumption in period
one when the government chooses not to adjust.) But an increase in L would
GSIJ LCl.Ll.ALC LILt Lit C LLJL UI. dJ.LJ LAb LLLL& LU LILt tALtILL LLLUL LULLbWUP CIVIL CaLL Ut
bettersmoothed. If the first effect dominates the second--i.e R >[U'(Y+
L -K)-U(Y+Lfl--Lshould be increased. Otherwise, L should be reduced.
Figure 1 shows three possibilitites:2 in Figure 1(a), dL/dB is initially
negative in the relevant range, and then turns positive; in Figure 1(b), dL/dB
is negative throughout; and in Figure 1(c), dL/d is positive throughout.
There is one final case to consider in completing the description of
P4n,,rO 1t,n,! ,-1,t- 4 e. .4, .4.. .....1 .1 h. 4.. — A5L St nLst .IkL ta LLLC Lac WLiCLC Lile WVCLLUiltiL WUULt.S L&WL ue Lii UVLtiti
2Aslong as U'' '>0, these are the only possibilities.
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government  remains  indifferent  between  adjusting  and  not  adjusting.  The 
relation  between  L  and  B  along  this  schedule  is  given  by: 
(6)  dL/dB  -  1  -  (PI?)-'[U'(Y  +  L  -  K)  -  U'(Y  +  L)], 
which  is  of  ambiguous  sign  since  the  expression  in  the  square  brackets  is 
positive  as  long  as  U"  <  0. 
The  explanation  for  the  ambiguity  is  as  follows.  A  dollar  increase  in  B 
increases  the  net  benefit  from  adjusting  by  /JR dollars  (since  this  is  the 
discounted  present  value  of  the  increase  in  second  period  consumption  when 
adjusting).  Should  L  be  increased  or  decreased  to  offset  the  added  incentive 
to  adjust?  Now an  increase  in  L  would  reduce  the  benefit  of  adjusting  to  the 
extent  that  the  discounted  second  period  consumption  would  fall.  (Since 
overhang  prevails  when  not  adjusting,  L  does  not  affect  consumption  in  period 
one  when  the  government  chooses  not  to  adjust.)  But  an  increase  in  L  would 
also  reduce  the  net  cost  of  adjusting  to  the  extent  that  consumption  can  be 
better  smoothed.  If  the  first  effect  dominates  the  second--i.e.,  BR >  [U'(Y  + 
L  -  K)  -  U'(Y  +  L)]--L  should  be  increased.  Otherwise,  L  should  be  reduced. 
Figure  1  shows  three  possibilitites:  '  in  Figure  l(a).  dL/dB  is  initially 
negative  in  the  relevant  range,  and  then  turns  positive;  in  Figure  l(b),  dL/dB 
is  negative  throughout;  and  in  Figure  l(c),  dL/dB  is  positive  throughout. 
There  is  one  final  case  to  consider  in  completing  the  description  of 
Figure  1,  and  that  is  the  case  where  the  government  would  not  be  in  overhang 
2  As  long  as U"'>O,  these  are  the  only  possibilities. -20-
even when it failed to adjust. The locus that describes indifference to
adjustiDent in this case is given by the following equality:
(7)U(Y +L)-U(Y+L-K)—9Y.
This defines implicitly a level of L, L**, which makes this equality hold.
.. * Thl.s s1.nepenent or as is L)•anaitiseasy to cnec tnat L<
Thisexplains the vertical line that separates zone III froni zone I in Figure
1,
Figure 1 completely describes government behavior and the consequent
overhang status in response to any combination of debt reduction (B) and new
money (L). Several things are noteworthy here. First, note that the country
will always choose to adjust for a sufficiently large amount of new lending,
-.I __ 2_ ____i 1.__Sfl..t. — even in Erie aosence ot conoitionaiiy ias is assumeu here). ne reason is
that adjustment is, by assumption, a good bargain for the country when itcan
borrow at world interest rates. An additional reason is that when the country
ends up in overhang, as it will for large L, it does not have to pay the loan
back. Second, and more obviously, a large enough debt reduction will always
eliminate the overhang.
But to eliminate the overhang get the government to adjust (Zone II).
- -. - - -' 2 ___ tte country needs bOth new money ana GeDt reauct.on.'Jne ajone wlii.no uo
thetrick. New money tends to enhance the incentive to adjust by alleviating
the short-run costs, but renders overhang more likely down the line. Debt
reduction works against the overhang, but has uncertain benefits with regard
to the adjustment incentive: in terms of Figure 1, debt reduction increases
th1ut,,ønt 1ikHhôd .n1v when 1. 1iq I" andL*.The ----
appropriatestrategy, therefore, will involve a bit of both.
-2o- 
aven  when  it  failed  to  adjust.  The  locus  that  describes  indifference  to 
adjustment  in  this  case  is  given  by  the  following  equality: 
(7)  U(Y  +  L)  -  U(Y  +  L  -  K)  -  BOY. 
This  defines  implicitly  a  level  of  L,  Lo',  which  makes this  equality  hold. 
This  is  independent  of  B  (as  is  L*),  and  it  is  easy  to  check  that  L"  <  L'. 
This  explains  the  vertical  line  that  separates  zone  III  from  zone  I  in  Figure 
Figure  1  completely  describes  government  behavior  and  the  consequent 
overhang  status  in  response  to  any  combination  of  debt  reduction  (B)  and  new 
money  (L).  Several  things  are  noteworthy  here.  First,  note  that  the  country 
will  always  choose  to  adjust  for  a  sufficiently  large  amount  of  new  lending, 
even  in  the  absence  of  conditionality  (as  is  assumed here).  The  reason  is 
that  adjustment  is,  by  assumption,  a  good  bargain  for  the  country  when  it  can 
borrow  at  world  interest  rates.  An  additional  reason  is  that  when  the  country 
ends  up  in  overhang,  as  it  will  for  large  L,  it  does  not  have  to  pay  the  loan 
back.  Second,  and  more  obviously,  a  large  enough  debt  reduction  will  always 
eliminate  the  overhang. 
But  to  eliminate  the  overhang  &  get  the  government  to  adjust  (zone  II), 
the  country  needs  both  new  money  and  debt  reduction.  One  alone  will  not  do 
the  trick.  New money  tends  to  enhance  the  incentive  to  adjust  by  alleviating 
the  short-run  costs,  but  renders  overhang  more  likely  down  the  line.  Debt 
reduction  works  against  the  overhang,  but  has  uncertain  benefits  with  regard 
to  the  adjustment  incentive:  in  terms  of  Figure  1,  debt  reduction  increases 
the  adjustment  likelihood  only  when  L  lies  between  L"  and  L'.  The 
approprfate  strategy,  therefore,  will  involve  a  bit  of  both. -21-
III. Whatlindof Creditor-Debtor Dealz Are Possible?
Letusassume that commercial banks can overcome the coordination problem
inherent in their interaction with the debtor government and can act
collectively. We should expect them to be aware of the possibility (portrayed
in Figure 1) that they can influence the behavior of the government by
proViaing it witfl an appropriate package 01newmoney anu aeoc reouction.
Whenwillthey have the incentive to offer such a package, and what would the
package look like? In other words, when can the debtor government and the
banks reach mutually-advantageous bargains in the absence of the IFIs? The
answers to these questions will provide the benchmark against which the
nossible bargains with IFI involvement can be measured.
Let us first discuss the returns to banks in different zones of Figure 1.
When the country is in overhang, the face value of the debt outstanding is
irrelevant to the banks' profits. Their profits in period one can therefore
be writtenas:
aY(1+9) -RL,when the country adjusts (zone III)
(8)ir(B,L) —-j
aY -RL, otherwise (Zone IV).
Note that this is independent of B, as B affects only the face value of the
debt as long as the overhang is still in effect. Also note that the
opportunity cost of the new money, RL, should be subtracted from period one
profits. Giving new money may make sense to the banks only if this makes the
country adiutrsinr (' it-.1, t-ht- rh n-,nfir
curves in zones III and IV are vertical lines which represent increasing
profits as they cone closer to the origin.
In the no-overhang zones, bank profits in period one are given by:
-21- 
1x1.  Vhat  Kj,nd  of  Creditor-Debtor  Deals  Are  Possible? 
Let  us  assume  that  commercial  banks  can  overcome  the  coordination  problem 
inherent  in  their  interaction  with  the  debtor  government  and  can  act 
collectively.  We  should  expect  them  to  be  aware  of  the  possibility  (portrayed 
in  Figure  1)  that  they  can  influence  the  behavior  of  the  government  by 
providing  it  with  an  appropriate  package  of  new  money  and  debt  reduction. 
When  will  they  have  the  incentive  to  offer  such  a  package,  and  what  would  the 
package  look  like?  In  other  words,  when  can  the  debtor  government  and  the 
banks  reach  mutually-advantageous  bargains  in  the  absence  of  the  IFIs?  The 
answers  to  these  questions  will  provide  the  benchmark  against  which  the 
possible  bargains  wirh  IFI  involvement  can  be  measured, 
Let  us  first  discuss  the  returns  to  banks  in  different  zones  of  Figure  1. 
When  the  country  is  in  overhang,  the  face  value  of  the  debt  outstanding  is 
irrelevant  to  the  banks'  profits.  Their  profits  in  period  one  can  therefore 
be  written  as: 
t 
aY(l+B)  -  RL.  when  the  country  adjusts  (zone  III) 
(8)  x(B,L)  - 
aY  -  RL,  otherwise  (zone  IV). 
Note  that  this  is  independent  of  B.  as  B  affects  only  the  face  value  of  the 
debt  as  long  as  the  overhang  is  still  in  effect.  Also  note  that  the 
opportunity  cost  of  the  new  money,  RL,  should  be  subtracted  from  period  one 
profits.  Giving  new  money  may  make  sense  to  the  banks  only  if  this  makes  the 
country  adjust.  Expression  (8)  makes  it  clear  that  the  banks'  iso-profit 
curves  in  zones  III  and  IV  are  vertical  lines  which  represent  increasing 
profits  as  they  come  closer  to  the  origin. 
In  the  no-overhang  zones,  bank  profits  in  period  one  are  given  by: -22-
(9) ir(3,L) —RED
-B (zones I and II).
Note that L does not enter this expression because we assume that the interest
charged on the new loans match the opportunity cost of funds, making banks
indifferent to lending when they can recover their money. We could have
assumed that banks make excess profits on their loans to creditworthy clients
without altering any of the subsequent qualitative results. In any case,
expression fb)makeSbanK 3.So-prOtlt curves florizontai. Lines in zones Ian
II, with lower lines representing higher profits.
To abstract from bargaining issues, let us suppose that banks move first
and can make a take-it-or-leave it offer to the country. What will they
choose to do? Banks will offer one of three types of packages:
f4\p3., ,4.,1T1, .- 1,, .4, 4,, 1..,4-', P — A./•flJ •
— 0.In this case, the government chooses not to adjust, and the country
remains in overhang. Incidentally, a small amount of debt reduction (small in
thatitdoes not push us into zone I) would not hurt the banks or benefit the
country, as it does not affect the repayment in period one.3
(ii) The banks offer a package that consists of ne money amounting to
and a range of debt reduction anywhere bctween zero and B One such package
LS snownas tlie point A10 uigure£O).LIOWtriecountry gets enougri LnancJng
to adjust. ?ut the banks are indifferent as to whether the overhang is
This is due to the absence of uncertainty. When period one outcomes are
uncertain, hanging on to the higher face value has an option value for the
banks which arises from the possibility that the debt will be serviced in full
in some good state of nature.
-22- 
(9)  n(B,L)  -  R[D  -  B]  (zones  I  and  II). 
Note  that  L  does  not  enter  this  expression  because  we  assume that  the  interest 
charged  on  the  new  loans  match  the  opportunity  cost  of  funds,  making  banks 
indifferent  to  lending  when  they  can  recover  their  money.  We could  have 
assumed  that  banks  make  excess  profits  on  their  loans  to  creditworthy  clients 
without  altering  any  of  the  subsequent  qualitative  results.  In  any  case, 
expression  (8)  makes bank  iso-profit  cumes  horizontal  lines  in  sones  I  and 
II,  with  lower  lines  representing  higher  profits. 
To  abstract  from  bargaining  issues,  let  us  suppose  that  banks  move  first 
and  can  make  a  take-it-or-leave  it  offer  to  the  country.  What  will  they 
choose  to  do?  Banks  will  offer  one  of  three  types  of  packages: 
(i)  No  deal.  This  is  represented  by  the  origin  in  Figure  1,  with  B  -  L 
-  0.  In  this  case,  the  government  chooses  not  to  adjust,  and  the  country 
remains  in  overhang.  Incidentally,  a  small  amount  of  debt  reduction  (small  in 
that  it  does  not  push  us  into  zone  I)  would  not  hurt  the  banks  or  benefit  the 
country,  as  it  does  not  affect  the  repayment  in  period  one.’ 
(ii)  The  banks  offer  a  package  that  consists  of  new money  amounting  to  L’ 
and  a  range  of  debt  reduction  anywhere  batveen  zero  and  B’.  One  such  package 
is  shown  as  the  point  X  in  Figure  l(b).  Now the  country  gets  enough  financing 
to  adjust.  But  the  banks  are  indifferent  as  to  whether  the  overhang  is 
3  .  This  is  due  to  the  absence  of  uncertainty.  When period  one  outcomes  are 
uncertain,  hanging  on  to  the  higher  face  value  has  an  option  value  for  the 
banks  which  arises  from  the  possibility  that  the  debt  will  be  serviced  in  full 
in  some good  state  of  nature. -23-
*4, a t-1,ct- (n a4ti,ar racp ran opt- nn mnra eLLm1flateU UkL1JL,
thataY(l+9) out of the country. This explains why banks are indifferent
between providing debt reduction of (which is the minimum needed to
eliminate the hangover) and no debt reduction at all- -or anything in between.
(iii) The banks offer a package that consists of I(<L*) and B (< B*),
which is lust enough to eliminate the hangover and get the country to adjust.
This package is shown as the point Y in Figure 1(a). This package puts us
:......a iT.,nAnl (n,fnnt-oc rhh.nan,cirwhim nncnrinodinctmant J UL £hILIJ £.JLLC Si.• —ii--
Alternatively,they offer L** (< I..) and B (< B), shown as point Z in Figure
1(c), which has the same features. In either of these cases, the bank makes
more profits than with the package (B, L*). Note, however, that such
packages are feasible only when the border separating zones II and IV either
has an interior minimum, as in Figure 1(a), or is positively sloped
throughout, as in Figure 1(c). The reason banks want to ensure that the
JvcLtLats&sacs.Hs
thecountry would rationally choose not to adjust. (A slight reduction in B
starting from points '1 or Z would put the country in a no-adjustment zone).
In sununary, the alternatives are: (i) no deal; (ii) a package that
ensures adjustment but is indifferent to eliminating the hangover; and (Lii) a
package that ensures both adjustment and return to creditworthiness. One of
these three will dominate all other possible deals.
...,,-— AS.. 141 (\ S4ICIICt._ LLIJ&I La what. tic LCLLUSLLCa WIIC t_LLCL a iat.it.a E,CLLr.C . S S.F a.Lta
(iii)dominates the no-deal option. Consider profits when the package (B,
L) is offered. Bank profits are now iT(B*,L*)—i(O,L') —aY(l+)
-RL.
With no deal, banks get (O, 0) —ay.Therefore, the condition for the
package to be offered isaY(1+O)
-RL￿aY,Implying
-23- 
eliminated  or  not,  the  reason  being  that  in  either  case  they  can  get  no  more 
that  d(l+B)  out  of  the  country.  This  explains  why  banks  are  indifferent 
between  providing  debt  reduction  of  B*  (which  is  the  minimum  needed  to 
eliminate  the  hangover)  and  no  debt  reduction  at  all--or  anything  in  between. 
(iii)  The  banks  offer  a  package  that  consists  of  i  (<  L*)  and  i  (<  B'), 
which  is  just  enough  to  eliminate  the  hangover  and  get  the  country  to  adjust. 
this  package  is  shown  as  the  point  Y  in  Figure  l(a).  This  package  puts  us 
just  inside  zone  II,  and  eliminates  the  hangover  while  ensuring  adjustment. 
l 
Alternatively,  they  offer  L*'  (C  L)  and  B"*  (<  B'),  shown  as  point  Z  in  Figure 
l(c),  which  has  the  same  features.  In  either  of  these  cases,  the  bank  makes 
more  profits  than  with  the  package  (B'.  L').  Note,  however,  that  such 
packages  are  feasible  only  when  the  border  separating  zones  II  and  IV  either 
has  an  interior  minimum,  as  in  Figure  l(a),  or  is  positively  sloped 
throughout,  as  in  Figure  l(c).  The  reason  banks  want  to  ensure  that  the 
overhang  is  eliminated  in  this  case,  unlike  in  (ii)  above,  is  that  otherwise 
the  country  would  rationally  choose  not  to  adjust.  (A  slight  reduction  in  B 
starting  from  points  Y  or  Z  would  put  the  country  in  a  no-adjustment  zone). 
In  summary,  the  alternatives  are:  (i)  no  deal;  (ii)  a  package  that 
ensures  adjustment  but  is  indifferent  to  eliminating  the  hangover;  and  (iii)  a 
package  that  ensures  both  adjustment  and  return  to  creditworthiness.  One  of 
these  three  will  dominate  all  other  possible  deals. 
The  next  question  is  what  determines  whether  a  package  like  (ii)  and 
(iii)  dominates  the  no-deal  option.  Consider  profits  when  the  package  (B', 
L')  is  offered.  Bank  profits  are  now  n(B*,  L*)  -  ~(0.  L')  -  oY(l+B)  -  RL'. 
With  no  deal,  banks  get  ~(0,  0)  -  a~.  Therefore,  the  condition  for  the 
package  to  be  offered  is  aY(l+B)  -  RL*  t  aY,  implying -24-
(10) L*(a, 8, fi,K)aOY/R
This says that the minimumamountof new money required to make it worthwhile
for the country to adjust must be less than the discounted value of a fraction
of domestic resources, where the fraction equals the product of the
roductivitv improvement and the maximum share of domestic reourecpr'd
by creditors. If L falls short of this value, banks will be willing to offer
a deal. The condition tas a stratghttorward intuitive explanation. arkscan
extract at most a fraction, ,ofthe increment in domestic output, BY, when
the country adjusts. They have no incentive to spend norethanthis amount to
"purchase" adjustment.
As mentioned above, alternative packages such as (L,ñ), and(L, fl**)
tybanrho.., era Fonc4hlo nrtnr4Aa rho henlr ,.,4t.h 1,4a4, ar ni-a fl.-t.-..,.-.c-4, •••••I t&J_IICL JL¼JS.SI..a tflaIt kIc
(L,B*). Therefore, the condition expressed in (10) is a sufficient but not
necessary condition for a mutually-beneficial deal to exist. High values of B
and ,andlow values of K make it easier for the condition to be fulfilled,
while the effect ofis ambiguous.
Whatkindof practical guidance does (10) provide as to the likelihood of
mutually advantageous deals? The right-hand side ef the inequality above
aepens on two CEitiCLparaneters,a anc ,ootnor wnicrt are in principie
observable. For a, a range of 1 to 4 percent of GDP would seem a reasonable
one for most highly-indebted countries.9, which measures the permanent
. Theambiguity with respect to a is explained as follows. An increase in a
increases the extraction by creditors, but for the same reason increases the
threshold L at which debtor becomes willing to adjust.
-24. 
(10)  L.((I,  6,  p.  K)  5  aOY/R  . 
This  says  that  the  minimum  amount  of  new  money  required  to  make  it  worthwhile 
for  the  country  to  adjust  must  be  less  than  the  discounted  value  of  a  fraction 
of  domestic  resources,  where  the  fraction  equals  the  product  of  the 
productivity  improvement  and  the  maximum  share  of  domestic  resources  extracted 
by  creditors.  If  L'  falls  short  of  this  value,  banks  will  be  willing  to  offer 
a  deal.  The  condition  has  a  straightforward  intuitive  explanation.  Banks  can 
extract  at  most  a  fraction,  01, of  the  increment  in  domestic  output,  BY,  when 
the  country  adjusts.  They  have  no  incentive  to  spend  more  than  this  amount  to 
"purchase"  adjustment. 
As  mentioned  above,  alternative  packages  such  as  (i  ,8),  and  (L”,  B’*), 
when  they  are  feasible,  provide  the  bank  with  higher  profits  than  the  package 
(L',  B*).  Therefore,  the  condition  expressed  in  (10)  is  a  sufficient  but  not 
necessary  condition  for  a  mutually-beneficial  deal  to  exist.  High  values  of  8 
and  B.  and  low  values  of  K  make  it  easier  for  the  condition  to  be  fulfilled, 
while  the  effect  of  o  is  ambiguous.' 
Vhat  kind  of  practical  guidance  does  (10)  provide  as  to  the  likelihood  of 
mutually  advantageous  deals?  The  righr-hand  side  c:  the  inequality  abo;.e 
depends  on  two  critical  parameters,  o  and  8,  both  of  which  are  in  principle 
observable.  For  a,  a  range  of  1  to  4  percent  of  GDP would  seem a  reasonable 
one  for  most  highly-indebted  countries.  0,  which  measures  the  permanent 
4  .  The  ambiguity  with  respect  to  (I  is  explained  as  follows.  An  increase  in  (I 
increases  the  extraction  by  creditors,  but  for  the  same reason  increases  the 
threshold  L  at  which  debtor  becomes willing  to  adjust. -25-
productivity benefit of adjustment, can be estimated by conventional
techniques, such as those used at the World Bank and the IMF. Letusassume,
to be generous, that adjustment can increase the level of output permanently
by something in the range of 10-40percentagepoints.
Putting all these pieces together, we get the numbers shown in Table 5
-- rr. /t%S/fl C
wticr1 express trie sutricient COflaitiOnILVI. cror purposes oi nese
calculations,R is taken to be 1.1) The way to read the table is as follows:
When a is 2 percent, for example, the largest increase in exposure banks are
willing to accept during the whole adjustment period in return for a 20
percent permanent increase in the debtor's income is 0.36 percent of the
country's GDP. If new money of this amount is enough to make the country
undertake the required adjustment, the money is disbursed, then banks
wttt bewilling to otter sucr a pacage. Since aJustment episodes cannot te
expected to succeed in less than 3-5years,the nuibers in the table must be
divided by a factor of 3 to 5 to yield the maximum annual disbursement to GD?
that banks will be willing to offer. Therefore these illustrative
calculations are not encouraging with respect to the likelihood that banks and
debtnr rniinfri ne will eli crn,Jar mnrlll lv— ,Antunninc hsiro'incnn thairntrn —————." — .
Aswe will see in the next section, the presence of conditionality may relax
the constraint substantially.
IV. HovDoesConditionalityChangeThings?
Commercialbanks have little control over how their loans are used, once
disbursed. Political circunistances in debtor countries would scarcely allow
cnern to exeretse much influence over domestic poLicies. Nor would promises by
governments to undertake the requisite adjustment be credible if the net
benefits to adjusting remain negative after the funds are disbursed.
-25- 
productivity  benefit  of  adjustment,  can  be  estimated  by  conventional 
techniques,  such  as  those  used  at  the  World  Bank  and  the  IMF.  Let  us  assume, 
to  be  generous,  that  adjustment  can  increase  the  level  of  output  permanently 
by  something  in  the  range  of  lo-40  percentage  points. 
Putting  all  these  pieces  together,  we  get  the  numbers  shown  in  Table  5 
which  express  the  sufficient  condition  (10).  (For  purposes  of  these 
calculations,  R  is  taken  to  be  1.1)  The  way  to  read  the  table  is  as  follows: 
When  a  is  2  percent,  for  example,  the  largest  increase  in  exposure  banks  are 
willing  to  accept  during  the  whole  adjustment  period  in  return  for  a  20 
percent  permanent  increase  in  the  debtor's  income  is  0.36  percent  of  the 
country's  GDP.  If  new  money  of  this  amount  is  enough  to  make  the  country 
undertake  the  required  adjustment,  -  the  money  is  disbursed,  then  banks 
will  be  willing  to  offer  such  a  package.  Since  adjustment  episodes  cannot  be 
expected  to  succeed  in  less  than  3-5  years,  the  numbers  in  the  table  must  be 
divided  by  a  factor  of  3  to  5  to  yield  the  maximum  annual  disbursement  to  GDP 
that  banks  will  be  willing  to  offer.  Therefore  these  illustrative 
calculations  are  not  encouraging  with  respect  to  the  likelihood  that  banks  and 
debtor  countries  will  discover  mutually-advantageous  bargains  on  their  own. 
As  we  will  see  in  the  next  section,  the  presence  of  conditionality  may  relax 
the  constraint  substantially. 
IV.  How  Does  Conditionality  Change  Things? 
Commercial  banks  have  little  control  over  how  their  loans  are  used,  once 
disbursed.  Political  circumstances  in  debtor  countries  would  scarcely  allow 
them  to  exercise  much  influence  over  domestic  policies.  Nor  would  promises  by 
governments  to  undertake  the  requisite  adjustment  be  credible  if  the  net 
benefits  to  adjusting  remain  negative  after  the  funds  are  disbursed. -26-
Therefore, banks will be willing to spend new money only when they are fairly
certain that the money will be decisive in tilting governxnents incentives to
adjust. However, as the examples above show, the amount needed may be much
4.4, 4 .. ra 1 a r 4 ,n r, .4, a a,,antl 1.1 rat, ,r'n tn t4ia Iante e IIS6&t a_SI & .W14r%.a
Conditionalitychanges the nature of the bargain between creditors and
the debtor government. It makes the package conditional on adjustment being
undertaken, Now the cost-benefit calculus of the government is altered: it
has to compare the cost of adjustment against the cost of having to give up
external financing. When the choice is between adjusting with new money and
not adjusting without new money, it will take a lower amount of external
flnanrlnei-n nt.rrhnc adlt,ctmpnt rnmnnr.d i-n i-ha eaco wlnero nat, ,nnnavIs '"Ofl --..——— .—--—j ——
disbursedineithercase.Moreover, the country will typically be better off
with such conditionality also, as the alternative may well be no deal at all.
For similar discussions on conditionality, see Sachs (1989) and Claessens and
Diwan (1991)
To see what difference conditionality makes in our framework, we recast
the governments optimization problem making L available only when adjustment
4e








( max{Y -R[D-B],(1-a)Y}, otherwise.
t....C.. F1 .-t....- I t C r.r C 4n ),a ale utiiy UflLCLCIILC LLCLC flUUI IL) Lb lflLUueb IWL
non-adjustmentstates. The governments decision rule then becomes:
-26- 
Therefore,  banks  will  be  willing  to  spend  new money  only  when  they  are  fairly 
certain  that  the  money  will  be  decisive  in  tilting  governments'  incentives  to 
adjust.  However,  as  the  examples  above  show,  the  amount  needed  may  be  much 
too  high  in  relation  to  the  eventual  return  to  the  banks. 
Conditionality  changes  the  nature  of  the  bargain  between  creditors  and 
the  debtor  government.  It  makes  the  package  conditional  on  adjustment  being 
undertaken.  Now the  cost-benefit  calculus  of  the  government  is  altered:  it 
has  to  compare  the  cost  of  adjustment  against  the  cost  of  having  to  give  up 
external  financing.  When  the  choice  is  between  adjusting  with  new money  and 
not  adjusting  without  new  money,  it  will  take  a  lower  amount  of  external 
financing  to  purchase  adjustment  compared  to  the  case  where  new money  is 
disbursed  in  either  case.  Moreover,  the  country  will  typically  be  better  off 
with  such  conditionality  also,  as  the  alternative  may  well  be  no  deal  at  all. 
For  similar  discussions  on  conditionality,  see  Sachs  (1989)  and  Claessens  and 
Diwan  (1991). 
To  see  what  difference  conditionality  makes  in  our  framework,  we  recast 
the  government's  optimization  problem  making  L  available  only  when  adjustment 
is  chosen: 
(1’)  Max  W  -  U(C,)  +  PC, 
fY+L-K.  if  adjust 
s.t.  co-j 
I  y*  otherwise. 
c,  -  -1 
[  max  (Y(l+B)  -  R[D-B+L],  (1-a)Y(l+B)),  if  adjust 
i  max  iY  -  R[D-B],  (l-o)Y),  otherwise. 
The  only  difference  here  from  (1)  is  that  L  does  not  affect  C,  or  C,  in  the 
non-adjustment  states.  The  government's  decision  rule  then  becomes: -27-
(2)Adjust if:U(Y +L-K)+fi max (Y(1+9)-RED-B+L1,(1-a)Y(1+9))
U(Y) +fi max(Y -RID-8),(1-a)Y)
We can now proceed to determine the four zones of possible outcomes as before.
Since conditionality affects only the incentive to adjust, and not the
demarcation between overhang and no-overhang zones, we focus exclusively on
the former.
In the mresence of an overhang. the locus that separates the adjustment
zone from the no-adjustment zone is given by
(3') 13(Y) -U(Y4-L-K)—8(1-a)DY.
This defines implicitly a level of L, L, which makes this equality hold.
has the same qualitative properties as except that itisalways lower
(as can be seen by comparing this expression with [3']):
+ -- +
(4')L —L(a,6, ,K)<L.
Consider next the situation where the government would be in overhang if
——.4—._t.__.2_.. •T. £L L1L¼S LIUL. UUL LLUL Ut.1ItLWL. UIUW aUJUSCIIIeLIL Lt4ULLCS
U(Y+L-K)+fi(Y(li-9)-R[D-B+L))
￿ U(Y)+8(1-cz)Y,
(5') U(Y) -U(Y+L-K)+R[D--.-L](a + 6)Y.
The relation between L and B along this schedule is given by:
(6) dL/dB —1. -(Ry'U(Y+L-iC)<0,
with the negative sign unambiguous as long as the government remains liquidity
-27- 
(2’)  Adjust  if:  U(Y  +  t  -  K)  +  p  max  (Y(l+#)  -  R[D-B+L],  (l-a)Y(l+B)] 
>-  U(Y)  +  B  q ax  (Y  -  R[D-B],  (l-a)Y) 
We  can  now  proceed  to  determine  the  four  zones  of  possible  outcomes  as  before. 
Since  conditionality  affects  only  the  incentive  to  adjust,  and  not  the 
demarcation  between  overhang  and  no-overhang  zones,  we  focus  exclusively  on 
the  former. 
In  the  presence  of  an  overhang,  the  locus  that  separates  the  adjustment 
zone  from  the  no-adjustment  zone  is  given  by 
(3')  U(Y)  -  U(Y  +  L  -  K)  -  P(l-a)BY. 
This  defines  implicitly  a  level  of  L,  L*,,  which  makes  this  equality  hold. 
L',  has  the  same  qualitative  properties  as  L'.  except  that  it  is  always  lower 
(as  can  be  seen  by  comparing  this  expression  with  [3']): 
+  -  -  + 
(4')  Lf,  -  L',(a,  8.  fi,  K)  <  L'. 
Consider  next  the  situation  where  the  government  would  be  in  overhang  if 
it  did  not  adjust  but  not  otherwise.  Now  adjustment  requires 
U(Y  +  L  -  K)  +  ,9(Y(l+B)  -  R[D-B+L]) 
2  U(Y)  +  ,8(1-n)Y, 
or: 
(5')  U(Y)  -  U(Y  +  L  -  K)  +  R[D-B+L]  5  (a  +  b')fiY. 
The  relation  between  L  and  B  along  this  schedule  is  given  by: 
(6')  dL/dB  -  1  -  (BR)-lU'(Y  +  L  -  K)  <  0, 
with  the  negative  sign  unambiguous  as  long  as  the  government  remains  liquidity -28-
constrained (i.e., U' >DR).Hence, unlike in the no-conditionality case, an
n1.1jav.c incraces Adiutmantincentivcn th I,.f'——. r.—J,.
Thisand the earlier schedule under no conditionality (5) are related as
follows: (i) the twomeetwhen L —0;and (ii) the schedule with
conditionality always lies below the no-conditionality schedule.
Finally, consider the case where the government would not be in overhang
even when it failed to adjust. The locus that describes indifference to
adjustment in this case is given by:
(7)U(Y) -U(Y+L-K)—9Y,
which defines implicitly a level of L, which makes tha equality hold.
Once again, this is lower than the corresponding level under no
conditionality, LC <L**.
Figure 2 shows the new configuration and how it relates to its analogue
in the absence of conditionality. The main thing to notice here is that the
two aajustmsnt zones ii ana Iii) nave expanGecl. Lone IL acjustment aria no
overhang) is now larger by the single-hatched area, and zone III (adjustment
with overhang) is now larger by the double-hatched area. The implication is
thatlower levels of new money and debt reduction are required to get the
country to adjust and eliminate the overhang in the presence of
,.nnA1t4nnl 4 p,
Now consider the type of package that banks might be willing to offer to
the governnent when conditionality is in effect. The relevant options are now
two-fold: (I) no deal (L —B—0);and (ii) a package that consists of L —
L and B E[0,Bj. Other options are dominated by one of these two for
the fo11owin reason: bank vrofits are increasing in the southern direction in
zone II and the 1ope of the border separating zones II and IV is
-2g- 
constrained  (i.e.,  U'  >  BR).  Hence,  unlike  in  the  no-conditionality  case,  an 
increase  in  L  always  increases  adjustment  incentives  in  this  case  (cf.  [6]). 
This  and  the  earlier  schedule  under  no  conditionality  (5)  are  related  as 
follows:  (i)  the  two  meet  when  L  -  0;  and  (ii)  the  schedule  with 
conditionality  always  lies  below  the  no-conditionality  schedule. 
Finally,  consider  the  case  where  the  government  would  not  be  in  overhang 
even  when  it  failed  to  adjust.  The  locus  that  describes  indifference  to 
adjustment  in  this  case  is  given  by: 
(7')  U(Y)  -  U(Y  +  L  -  K)  -  ,98Y, 
which  defines  implicitly  a  level  of  L,  L,",  which  makes  the  equality  hold 
Once  again,  this  is  lower  than  the  corresponding  level  under  no 
conditionality,  L,**  <  L'*. 
Figure  2  shows  the  new  configuration  and  how  it  relates  to  its  analogue 
in  the  absence  of  conditionality.  The  main  thing  to  notice  here  is  that  the 
two  adjustment  zones  (II  and  III)  have  expanded.  Zone  II  (adjustment  and  no 
overhang)  is  now  larger  by  the  single-hatched  area,  and  zone  III  (adjustment 
with  overhang)  is  now  larger  by  the  double-hatched  area.  The  implica:ion  is 
that  lower  levels  of  new  money  and  debt  reduction  are  required  to  get  the 
country  to  adjust  and  eliminate  the  overhang  in  the  presence  of 
conditionality. 
Now  consider  the  type  of  package  that  banks  might  be  willing  to  offer  to 
the  government  when  conditionality  is  in  effect.  The  relevant  options  are  now 
two-fold:  (i)  no  deal  (L  -  B  -  0);  and  (ii)  a  package  that  consists  of  L  - 
L',  and  B  E  [0,  B',].  Other  options  are  dominated  by  one  of  these  two  for 
the  following  reason:  bank  profits  are  increasing  in  the  southern  direction  in 
zone  II  and  the  slope  of  the  border  separating  zones  II  and  IV  is -29-
unaibiguous1y negative under conditionality. The condition for (ii) to be
nreferred to (1) by the banks is anologous to the trevious condition, namely
(10') L*c(a, 9, K)a9Y/R.
sow, since < L*, this is a less restrictive condition than the one in the
absence of condittonality. In other words, conditionality expands the range
of mutually-beneficial bargains between banks and the debtor government.
Can we say anything about the size of the gap between L and L*? For
.--' L Ut LU A. t_ S UI La A. S UI_U Lila. NC at, JSCaA.UIS1_J_C,C.,._.C.1_IL &aL._l._S..Cfrl..LLC IL aO I_S.d U C a
meaningfulnumber. To get at this issue in a rough way, we can first combine
(3) and (3) to write:
0 0 0
UI 1 L) -UIIt L -N)UX) -UII+ -
Nowassume that utility is logarithmic. Rearranzina terms, we get:
log(Y +L*)-logY —log(Y-i-L* -K)-log(Y+L-K).
We can interpret each side of this equality as approximating a percentage
change. As long as L is small relative to Y, this will not a bad
approximation. Hence:
L/Y — (L*-L)/(Y+- K),
which yields after simplifying:
(11)L*0/L* —K/(Y+L*).
Therefore, the ratio of L to L is roughly of the order of the short-run
adjustment cost relative to GD?. ks it is difficult to imagine that
adjustment costs would exceed 10 percent of income, L should normally be
-29- 
unambiguously  negative  under  conditionality.  The  condition  for  (ii)  to  be 
preferred  to  (i)  by  the  banks  is  analogous  to  the  previous  condition,  namely 
(10')  2,(a,  8,  p,  K)  5  dY/R. 
Now,  since  L*,  <  L*,  this  is  a  less  restrictive  condition  than  the  one  in  the 
absence  of  conditionality.  In  other  words,  conditionality  expands  the  range 
of  mutually-beneficial  bargains  between  banks  and  the  debtor  government. 
Can we  say  anything  about  the  size  of  the  gap  between  L',  and  L"?  For 
conditionality  to  make  any  real  difference  in  practice,  the  gap  has  to  be  a 
meaningful  number.  To  get  at  this  issue  in  a  rough  way,  we  can  first  combine 
(3)  and  (3')  to  write: 
U(Y  +  L')  -  U(Y  +  L'  -  K)  -  U(Y)  -  U(Y  +  L',  -  K). 
Now assume  that  utility  is  logarithmic.  Rearranging  terms,  we  get: 
1°g(y  +  L')  -  log  -I' -  log(Y.+  L'  -  K)  -  log(y  +  L',  _ K), 
We can  interpret  each  side  of  this  equality  as  approximating  a  percentage 
change.  As  long  as  L'  is  small  relative  to  Y,  this  will  not  a  bad 
approximation.  Hence: 
L./y -  (L'  -  L',)/(Y  +  Let  -  K), 
which  yields  after  simplifying: 
(11)  L'Ji  -  K/(Y  +  L*). 
Therefore,  the  ratio  of  L',  to  L'  is  roughly  of  the  order  of  the  short-run 
adjustment  cost  relative  to  GDP.  As  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  that 
adjustment  costs  would  exceed  10  percent  of  income,  L*,  should  normally  be -30-
quite a small fraction of l..
Hence, if this illustrative calculation is anyguide.conditionality can
make a big difference indeed--at least when it is effective. It considerably
enlarges the parameter space within Which a mutuaily-atvantageous bargain is
possible.
One advantage of IFI participation, therefore, is the provision of
conditionality. Another, as mentioned in the introduction, is better
information. For mutually-advantageous bargains can be ruled out not only by
the inability of the £overnment tocrediblycommititceiftoadiuctmert (n -J -— —--- - ——
theabsence of explicit conditionality), but also by asymmetric information.
The commercial banks are poor Judges ot the cost of adjustment (K) or the
productivity enhancement (6) to be experienced by different countries. Under
asymmetric information of this sort, they are likely to be more conservative
in spending new money than they would have been under complete information.
All the more so since debtors will have the incentive to "cheat by claiming
1_..Ut4.k ltl....1.. .A I... Lvw r ilL tt4.611 VLflLi.iJL LISCi. LuaIi. ac.jiaamcti IWJLC LSI¼CLJ aLl!.A pLi,LSLaLJLC itt
order to qualify for new loans. In a "pooling" equilibrium, deserving
countries will be denied mutually-beneficial packages. In a 'separating
equilibrium, countries will have to invest in costly signals to qualify for
these packages. In either case, some efficient outcomes will be ruled out.
The IFIs themselves cannot observe erfectlv all the relevant debtor
characteristics. But perhaps they are somewhat better at this than the banks
thems1ves, in view of the monitoring and analysis undertaken by their desk
economists. To the extent that IFIs can disseminate harder" information,
then, they would allow some deals to be struck which may have otherwise been
missed.
Finally, consider the effect of conditionality on the debtor's welfare.
-3O- 
quite  *  small  fraction  of  L'. 
Hence,  if  this  illustrative  calculation  is  any  guide,  conditionality  can 
make  a  big  difference  indeed  --at  least  when  it  is  effective.  It  considerably 
enlarges  the  parameter  space  within  which  a  mutually-advantageous  bargain  is 
possible. 
One  advantage  of  IF1  participation,  therefore,  is  the  provision  of 
conditionality.  Another,  as  mentioned  in  the  introduction,  is  better 
information.  For  mutually-advantageous  bargains  can  be  ruled  out  not  only  by 
the  inability  of  the  government  to  credibly  commit  itself  to  adjustment  (in 
the  absence  of  explicit  conditionality),  but  also  by  asymmetric  information. 
The  commercial  banks  are  poor  judges  of  the  cost  of  adjustment  (K)  or  the 
productivity  enhancement  (B)  to  be  experienced  by  different  countries.  Under 
asymmetric  information  of  this  sort,  they  are  likely  to  be  more  conservative 
in  spending  new  money  than  they  would  have  been  under  complete  information. 
All  the  more  so  since  debtors  will  have  the  incentive  to  "cheat"  by  claiming 
low  K  or  high  8,  factors  that  make  adjustment  more  likely  and  profitable,  in 
order  to  qualify  for  new  loans.  In  a  "pooling"  equilibrium,  deserving 
countries  will  be  denied  mutually-beneficial  packages.  In  a  "separating" 
equilibrium,  countries  will  have  to  invest  in  costly  signals  to  qualify  for 
these  packages.  In  either  case,  some  efficient  outcomes  will  be  ruled  out. 
The  IFIs  themselves  cannot  observe  perfectly  all  the  relevant  debtor 
characteristics.  But  perhaps  they  are  somewhat  better  at  this  than  the  banks 
themselves,  in  view  of  the  monitoring  and  analysis  undertaken  by  their  desk 
economists.  To  the  extent  that  IFIs  can  disseminate  "harder"  information, 
then,  they  would  allow  some  deals  to  be  struck  which  may  have  otherwise  been 
missed. 
Finally,  consider  the  effect  of  conditionality  on  the  debtor's  welfare. -31-
The government's wei.rare is increasing in L as tong as tt remains credit
constrained, and it is also increasing in B in the no-overhang regions. (In
the presence of overhang, B does not affect anything.) Therefore, the
government becomes better off as we move in the northeast direction in Figures
1 and 2. As long as banks would have chosen not to offer a deal in the
ofconditionality, the £overnment is always at 1ast asw11off .,ii-} — - c_I
-— -— -- —
conditionalityas without. In this instance, conditionality benefits the
debtor because it provides it with an ability to precommit, and therefore
undoes the damage caused by the dynamic inconsistency in adjustment policy.
Note, however, that when creditors move first and can make a take-it-or-leave-
itoffer,they can cream off the entire surplus from the debtor: when the
debtor gets the offer (La, B), it is indifferent between not having a deal
and adiustin.
There is also another possibility. Let us suppose that a point like X in
Figure 1(b) is indeed feasible, in the sense that banks would have offered
such a package in the absence of IFIs. With conditional lending, the banks
can now do better, and offer a package that consists of lower L and lower B.
The upshot is that banks are better off, but the debtor government is now
worse off. In this case, banks would have been willing to bribe" the
government to adiust. and eondtra1it-v r1mth 4h,h
banks will now have the incentive to "game" against the IFIs, trying to draw
Enem into the action. Unlike in the previous case, the debtor is harmed if
they succeed.
Therefore, it is not a foregone conclusion that conditionality and IFI
involvement will improve the outcome from the perspective of the banks and the
debtors alike. The debtors, in particular, can be made worse off. The
essential criterion i h1 .,n,,l,4 ho ,.,4114,,' -- — -— — .. — I 11.1 — I_L_LI_.I_.LI CSSS1. 4 I 4_I_II_!_JUIC I.AJ W .I_ 4_LI C
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The  government's  welfare  is  increasing  in  L  as  long  as  it  remains  credit 
constrained,  and  it  is  also  increasing  in  B  in  the  no-overhang  regions.  (In 
the  presence  of  overhang,  B  does  not  affect  anything.)  Therefore,  the 
government  becomes  better  off  as  we  move  in  the  northeast  direction  in  Figures 
1  and  2.  As  long  as  banks  would  have  chosen  not  to  offer  a  deal  in  the 
absence  of  conditionality,  the  government  is  always  at  least  as  well  off  with 
conditionality  as  without.  In  this  instance,  conditionality  benefits  the 
debtor  because  it  provides  it  with  an  ability  to  precommit,  and  therefore 
undoes  the  damage  caused  by  the  dynamic  inconsistency  in  adjustment  policy. 
Note,  however,  that  when  creditors  move  first  and  can  make  a  take-it-or-leave- 
it  offer,  they  can  cream  off  the  entire  surplus  from  the  debtor:  when  the 
debtor  gets  the  offer  (L',,  B',),  it  is  indifferent  between  not  having  a  deal 
and  adjusting. 
There  is  also  another  possibility.  Let  us  suppose  that  a  point  like  X  in 
Figure  l(b)  is  indeed  feasible,  in  the  sense  that  banks  would  have  offered 
such  a  package  in  the  absence  of  IFIs.  With  conditional  lending,  the  banks 
can  now  do  better,  and  offer  a  package  that  consists  of  lower  L  and  lower  B. 
The  upshot  is  that  banks  are  better  off,  but  the  debtor  government  is  now 
worse  off.  In  this  case,  banks  would  have  been  willing  to  "bribe"  the 
government  to  adjust,  and  conditionality  reduces  the  needed  bribe.  Note  that 
banks  will  now  have  the  incentive  to  "game"  against  the  IFIs,  trying  to  draw 
them  into  the  action.  Unlike  in  the  previous  case,  the  debtor  is  harmed  if 
they  succeed. 
Therefore,  it  is  not  a  foregone  conclusion  that  conditionality  and  IF1 
involvement  will  improve  the  outcome  from  the  perspective  of  the  banks  and  the 
debtors  alike.  The  debtors,  in  particular,  can  be  made  worse  off.  The 
essential  criterion  is  whether  banks  would  have  been  willing  to  come  up  with  a -32-
package in the absence of IFIs. If they would not have, IFIs will improve
matters for both sides as lori as there are enuine efficiency ain inth
first place. If they would have, IFIs must set conditions to ensure that the
gains are not appropriated disproportionately by the banks.
V. The Design of DDSR. and NewoneyPackageswhenrFIzareInvolved
Onepoint has been finessed in the discussion so far. Does IFI
conditionality actually require lending by IFIs? Why could IFIs not simply
flint- t-hpirlninrmtiirnn adlilctmAnt nrnarRm nnd mnnitnr whptbpr thc. nrno-rmcro
arebeing implemented, without lending money? After all, once conditionality
is in place, commercial banks should be willing to come up with the requisite
new lending, as discussed above, provided there are efficiency gains.
Yet a situation in which IFIs provide only conditionality and no money of
their ownisunlikely to be acceptable either to the banks or the debtor
government. Consider the banks first. They are likely to be suspicious of
...._............J k.. .-L.. Tt'T..t ..L.. 1 1 Lilt quasicyVtLilt IUVLLLLVLSLLy, pLuviueu UJ Lilt iris it Lilt £aLLtL Liave LLCLLt
incentiveto do a good job of it.They will naturally want IFIs to place
their own resources at risk as well as the banks--i.e. to put their money
where their mouth is. The debtor governments, on the other hand, are less
likely to accept conditionality imposed by a foreign institution, with all the
meddling in domestic tolicv that this entails, if conditionality comes without
any resources directly attached to it. It is often suspected that IFis do the
commercial banks dirty job for them; if conditionality comes without money,
what better proof could there be that this is indeed the Case?
Another reason why the IFIs provide money is to protect their previous
exposure. Remember that the primary motivation banks have in lending good
money after bad is that this may improve the chances of recovering previous
-32- 
package  in  the  absence  of  IFIs.  If  they  would  not  have.  IFIs  will  improve 
matters  for  both  sides  as  long  as  there  are  genuine  efficiency  gains  in  the 
first  place.  If  they  would  have,  IFIs  must  set  conditions  to  ensure  that  the 
gains  are  not  appropriated  disproportionately  by  the  banks. 
V.  Tbe  Design  of  DDSE  and  Her  Money  Packages  when  lTIs  are  Involved 
One  point  has  been  finessed  in  the  discussion  so  far.  Does  IF1 
conditionality  actually  require  lending  by  IFIs?  Why  could  IFIs  not  simply 
put  their  imprimatur  on  adjustment  programs  and  monitor  whether  the  programs 
are  being  implemented,  without  lending  money?  After  all.  once  conditionality 
is  in  place,  commercial  banks  should  be  willing  to  come  up  with  the  requisite 
new  lending,  as  discussed  above,  provided  there  are  efficiency  gains. 
Yet  a  situation  in  which  IFIs  provide  only  conditionality  and  no  money  of 
their  own  is  unlikely  eo  be  acceptable  either  to  the  banks  or  the  debtor 
government.  Consider  the  banks  first.  They  are  likely  to  be  suspicious  of 
the  quality  of  the  monitoring  provided  by  the  IFIs  if  the  latter  have  little 
incentive  to  do  a  good  job  of  it.  They  will  naturally  want  IFIs  to  place 
their  own  resources  at  risk  as  well  as  the  banks'--i.e.,  to  put  their  money 
where  their  mouth  is,  The  debtor  governments,  on  the  other  hand,  are  less 
likely  to  accept  conditionality  imposed  by  a  foreign  institution,  with  all  the 
meddling  in  domestic  policy  that  this  entails,  if  conditionality  comes  without 
any  resources  directly  attached  to  it.  It  is  often  suspected  that  IFIs  do  the 
commercial  banks'  dirty  job  for  them;  if  conditionality  comes  without  money, 
what  better  proof  could  there  be  that  this  is  indeed  the  case? 
Another  reason  why  the  IFIs  provide  money  is  to  protect  their  previous 
exposure.  Remember  that  the  primary  motivation  banks  have  in  lending  good 
money  after  bad  is  that  this  may  improve  the  chances  of  recovering  previous -33-
debts. Now when the IFIs also start out with some exposure to the problem
debtor, they have similar incentives.
Consequently, any realistic sort of conditionality will require lending
from the IFIs. Let us suppose that the proportion of the loan L supplied by
IFIs is ,with(l-7)L provided by the banks. We can see from tables 1 and 2
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ofcommercial lenders, proportionally to exposures. As a result, their share
of total debt increased over time. The question is how different types of
arrangements divide the burden of new finance and debt reduction and the
future payoff between the two categories of lenders. To build intuition, we
start with the case where the IFIs have no prior exposure to the problem
debtor.
(4'ITVT- ,,.ranr4nr 1.) SLL _________ ______________
Considerthe return to the IFIs when L =L*c,the minimum amount of new
money needed to get the debtor to adjust. When the overhang is eliminated,
which occurs when the commercial banks provide DDSR of exactly B*c, the IFIs
are repaid in full, and they get If banks provide DDSR of less than
P, the country adjusts but remains in overhang, which means that IFIs get
only a pro-rated share of repayments, I1L*c/(D +L)](aY(l+9)], which falls
,,.,.-.-cci, ..t.. ,rr. ___a OI•JLJSLALL LcpaJmclL.Lit LLAC LaLLtL Cdbt, LE.L CLLCCLLVeLy ettu up
subsidizingthe banks. For this cross..subsidy to be avoided, it is necessary
that banks provide sufficient debt reduction (here ')toeliminate the
overhang. In other words, for IFIs to make the "normal" return on their loan,
the banks must be willing to complement their action by a debt reduction that
is large enough to eliminate the overhang.
Banks would then be worse off compared with the case where they are
Try.. t..t t rr ,.. -' -,- 'L De oetter ort comparec wicn cne case wriere iris stay
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debts.  how  when  the  IFIs  also  start  out  with  some  exposure  to  the  problem 
debtor,  they  have  similar  incentives. 
Consequently,  any  realistic  sort  of  conditionality  will  require  lending 
from  the  IFIs.  Let  us  suppose  that  the  proportion  of  the  loan  L  supplied  by 
IFIs  is  7,  with  (l-T)L  provided  by  the  banks.  We can  see  from  tables  1  and  2 
that  the  IFIs'  and  bilateral  lenders'  shares  of  new  money  was  larger  than  that 
of  commercial  lenders,  proportionally  to  exposures.  As  a  result,  their  share 
of  total  debt  increased  over  time.  The  question  is  how  different  types  of 
arrangements  divide  the  burden  of  new  finance  and  debt  reduction  and  the 
future  payoff  between  the  two  categories  of  lenders.  To  build  intuition,  we 
start  with  the  case  where  the  IFIs  have  no  prior  exposure  to  the  problem 
debtor. 
(i)  IFIs  have  no  prior  exposure 
Consider  the  return  to  the  IFIs  when  L  -  L*,,  the  minimum amount  of  new 
money  needed  to  get  the  debtor  to  adjust.  When  the  overhang  is  eliminated, 
which  occurs  when  the  commercial  banks  provide  DDSR of  exactly  B',,  the  IFIs 
are  repaid  in  full,  and  they  get  7RL*,.  If  banks  provide  DDSR of  less  than 
B',  ,  the  country  adjusts  but  remains  in  overhang,  which  means that  IFIs  get 
only  a  pro-rated  share  of  repayments,  [rL*,/(D-B+L',)][oY(l+6)],  which  falls 
short  of  full  repayment.  In  the  latter  case,  IFIs  effectively  end  up 
subsidizing  the  banks.  For  this  cross-subsidy  to  be  avoided,  it  is  necessary 
that  banks  provide  sufficient  debt  reduction  (here  B',)  to  eliminate  the 
overhang.  In  other  words,  for  IFIs  to  make  the  "normal"  return  on  their  loan, 
the  banks  must  be  willing  to  complement  their  action  by  a  debt  reduction  that 
is  large  enough  to  eliminate  the  overhang. 
Banks  would  then  be  worse  off  compared  with  the  case  where  they  are 
subsidized  by  IFIs,  but  be  better  off  compared  with  the  case  where  IFIs  stay -34-
on the sidelines. To see the first part of this statement, note that the
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— oY(l+9)-RLC.Theappropriately pro-rated returns when overhang
prevails is ((D+(1.7)L*c]/(D+L*c))[aY(l+)]. With a little bit of algebra,
it can be shown that
a'Y(l+O) -RL<
for any feasible value of -y,sinceR[D+L] > aY(1+6). Therefore, banks
would actually preter to maintain the debtor in overhang when IF1
conditionality buys adjustment, as this is a way of transferring resources
from the IFIs to themselves. However, this requires that IFIs be willing
accept less than the market (or normal) return on their lending to the debtor.
To seethatbanks are still better off having a deal even when IFIs
rann4ra thin,, re, ,nndart,1en citfFr4 ant-rlchtradirt1 nnt-n pl n,i nrc t-ha nvcrHno
note that R(D-B] —aY(1+9)
-
RL*C>aY,since L*c <a9Y/Ras long as
efficiency gains exist from a debt package (cf. (10')).
If L > L*c, so that the debtor shares in the efficiency gains also, we
must have B >Bto ensure elimination of the overhang. In this case, each
additional dollar of ne money has to be matched by a dollar of debt reduction
(see Figure 2).
I 11) iris have PLLIJL expusure
Letus denote the proportion of initial debt held by IFIs by d. We will
tow derive the set of bargains that are available to the commercial creditors
and IFIs.
4e start by noting that when conditionality is imposed, debt redu.ctton
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thedistribution of the fi.iture debt service between creditors. Creditors that
on  the  sidelines.  To  see  the  first  part  of  this  statement,  note  that  the 
returns  to  the  banks  when  the  overhang  is  eliminated  through  debt  reduction  is 
R[D-B*,]  -  aY(l+B)  -  RL',.  The  appropriately  pro-rated  returns  when  overhang 
prevails  is  [[D+(l--,)L',]/(D+L',))[aY(l+B)].  With  a  little  bit  of  algebra, 
it  can  be  shown  that 
ay(l+B)  -  RL',  <  t[D+(l-~)L*,]/(D+L=,))[oY(l+e)] 
for  any  feasible  value  of  7,  since  R[D+L*,]  >  nY(l+B).  Therefore,  banks 
would  actually  prefer  to  maintain  the  debtor  in  overhang  when  IFI 
conditionality  buys  adjustment,  as  this  is  a  way  of  transferring  resources 
from  the  IFIs  to  themselves.  However,  this  requires  that  IFIs  be  willing 
accept  less  than  the  market  (or  normal)  return  on  their  lending  to  the  debtor. 
To  see  that  banks  are  still  better  off  having  a  deal  even  when  IFIs 
require  them  to  undertake  sufficient  debt  reduction  to  eliminate  the  overhang, 
note  that  R[D-B*,]  -  aY(l+@)  -  RL*,  >  aY,  since  L*,  <  aBY/R  as  long  as 
efficiency  gains  exist  from  a  debt  package  (cf.  [lo']). 
If  L  >  L.,,  so  that  the  debtor  shares  in  the  efficiency  gains  also,  we 
must  have  B  >  B*,  to  ensure  elimination  of  the  overhang.  In  this  case,  each 
additional  dollar  of  new  money  has  to  be  matched  by  a  dollar  of  debt  reducticn 
(see  Figure  2). 
(ii)  IFIs  have  urior  exDosure 
Let  us  denote  the  proportion  of  initial  debt  held  by  IFIs  by  d.  We  will 
now  derive  the  set  of  bargains  that  are  available  to  the  commercial  creditors 
and  IFIs. 
We  start  by  noting  that  when  conditionality  is  imposed,  debt  reduction 
does  not  affect  the  adjustment  behavior  of  the  debtor  country.  It  only  changes 
rhe  distribution  of  the  future  debt  service  between  creditors.  Creditors  that .35.
_._. r ...t_ ___, _C offer debt reaUCtlOfl in eiect reouce neir ucure cialw Qn ne poQi.OL
resourcesto be paid out, QY(1+O). Unless the IFIs get a large enough return
on their involvement, they can threaten to withhold support. Similarly, unless
the banks get a large enough share of the pie, it would be in their interests
to remain on the sidelines. Generally, there is a large set of arrangements
that satisfy these two constraints.
We first derive the IFIs' participation constraint. The IFIs will not
-.2-_--2_ _J .c1_____ C — __2___, .._1___ impose conoiLonaiLly anu inancea siiae 701.L[Ie newmoney LCULLCuu11ies
theirpayoff is not decreased in the operation. This rule is likely to apply
even when it is taken with a grain of salt. In reality, the IFIs may care less
about profitability than about certain other developmental goals. But in the
long run, some measure of profitability must certainly be part of their
objectives. We simply assume that IFIs participation occurs whenever:
Qai. 1- ) - 1KL,
where d' —(dD+7L)/(D-B+L),the post-deal IFI exposure. The inequality is
satisfied whenever the net return to IFIs with the package exceeds (or equals)
the net return without. This defines the combination of minimum debt relief,
B. and maximum share in new loan. -y.thatis necessary for IFIs to Eet
involved. Setting the inequality to zero, we get the IFIs' indifference
trontier shoi.m in tigure 3:
++ -
— B(,L,d, ,9)
Note that can be zero when d is large enough, and L and yaresmall
enouh.
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offer  debt  reduction  in  effect  reduce  their  future  claim  on  the  pool  of 
resources  to  be  paid  out,  oY(l+B).  Unless  the  IFIs  get  a  large  enough  return 
on  their  involvement,  they  can  threaten  to  withhold  support.  Similarly,  unless 
the  banks  get  a  large  enough  share  of  the  pie,  it  would  be  in  their  interests 
to  remain  on  the  sidelines.  Generally,  there  is  a  large  set  of  arrangements 
that  satisfy  these  two  constraints. 
We first  derive  the  IFIs'  participation  constraint.  The  IFIs  will  not 
impose  conditionality  and  finance  a  share  7  of  the  new money  required  unless 
their  payoff  is  not  decreased  in  the  operation.  This  rule  is  likely  to  apply 
even  when  it  is  taken  with  a  grain  of  salt.  In  reality,  the  IFIs  may  care  less 
about  profitability  than  about  certain  other  developmental  goals.  But  in  the 
long  run,  some measure  of  profitability  must  certainly  be  part  of  their 
objectives.  We simply  assume that  IFIs'  participation  occurs  whenever: 
&Y  5  d'oY(1  +  8)  -  yRL, 
where  d'  -  (dD+yL)/(D-B+L),  the  post-deal  IFI  exposure.  The  inequality  is 
satisfied  whenever  the  net  return  to  IFIs  with  the  package  exceeds  (or  equals) 
the  net  return  without.  This  defines  the  combination  of  minimum debt  relief, 
B,  and  maximum share  in  new  loan,  7,  that  is  necessary  for  IFIs  to  get 
involved.  Setting  the  inequality  to  zero,  we  get  the  IFIs'  indifference 
frontier  shown  in  figure  3: 
++--- 
BtTi" 
-  B  (7,  L.  d,  Q,  8) 
Note  that  Bm'" can  be  zero  when  d  is  large  enough,  and  L  and  7  are  small 
enough. -36-
Similarly, the banks' participation constraint requires that they do
better with the program than without, i.e. ,that:
/1a..,, ,1Jt..V/1 t fl/1 ..._\OY flD._., - U/Ill —U)IltL T U) -— 7/ - nap
where p' is the expected ex post price of debt, given by:
p — aY(1+O)/R(D -B+L]
This defines the maximum comination of relief, B, and new loans that can be
cc-A1_. •JL1_CLCh.S I_IJ lJahIr_a •= h,avs
+ + -**
BX —B(y,L,d, a,8)
The acceptable conbthations of (B, y) are represented in figure 3. All the
points between the banks' (B) and the IFIs' (Bmi) reservation constraints
are a priori feasible. In general, the higher the share of new loans financed
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Wenow investigate a particular division of the gains of the program
betwen the two classes of creditors, called the proportional distribution rule
(PDR). Under PDR, financial net payouts must be shared in proportion to
initial exposure. Although this may also be viewed as a "fair burden sharing
rule", there is nothing inherently fair about it. In reality, the efficiency
gains generated by IFIs conditionality have to be split between three
partLes: tne country, tne DanKs, anu tne iris cnemseives.
Define p as the pre-deal secondary-market price, p —aY/RD.The net
financial gains of the program, T, are given by the difference between the
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Similarly,  the  banks'  participation  constraint  requires  that  they  do 
better  with  the  program  than  without,  i.e.,  that: 
(1  -  d)aY  5  (1  -  d')aY(l  +  8)  -  (1  -  T)RL  -  RB~', 
where  p'  is  the  expected  ex  post  price  of  debt,  given  by: 
p'  -  aY(l  +  O)/  R[D  -  B  +  L] 
This  defines  the  maximum  comination  of  relief,  Bmm,  and  new  loans  that  can  be 
offered  by  banks.  We  have: 
++-  -  - 
Bm'=  -  B  (‘I,  L,  d,  a,  -9) 
The  acceptable  combinations  of  (B,  7)  are  represented  in  figure  3.  All  the 
points  between  the  banks'  (BmU)  and  the  IFIs'  (Bmin)  reservation  constraints 
are  a  priori  feasible.  In  general,  the  higher  the  share  of  new  loans  financed 
by  the  IFIs.  the  larger  the  required  debt  relief  from  the  banks. 
We  now  investigate  a  particular  division  of  the  gains  of  the  program 
betwen  the  two  classes  of  creditors,  called  the  proportional  distribution  rule 
(PDR).  Under  PDR,  financial  net  payouts  must  be  shared  in  proportion  to 
initial  exposure.  Although  this  may  also  be  viewed  as  a  "fair  burden  sharing 
rule".  there  is  nothing  inherently  fair  about  it.  In  reality,  the  efficiency 
gains  generated  by  IFIs'  conditionality  have  to  be  split  between  three 
parties:  the  country,  the  banks,  and  the  IFIs  themselves. 
Define  p  as  the  pre-deal  secondary-market  price,  p  -  aY/RD.  The  net 
financial  gains  of  the  program,  T,  are  given  by  the  difference  between  the -37-
capital gains on the existing stock of debt RD(p- p) and the capital losses
on the new loans RL(l-p) and on the forgiven debt .3p'. It can be checked
that the net financial gain T —R.D(p'p) -P1(1-p') -Rap'is equal to the
real gain, 9Y-RL, using the definitions of p and p'Since the IFIs do not
engage in debt relief, their net payout, I, is given by the differencebetween
.i..,e .-,. sni-.1-1 1n,t *n * oftheloss on new loans. a as,ns
—
PDRrequires that:
(12) d —l/T—(dD(p'p) -7L(1-p)]/(D(p'-p) -L(1
-p')
-np']
which can be rewritten as:
f19''P/I. — U-—d/dr(1 —r,fl/n1 '...' dJ USr ,,r J
Because all creditors share proportionally in the net financial gain under
FDR, their net payoff per dollar of exposure is the swe. To see that, note
that the payoff per dollar of exposure for the IFIs is given by II+dDp]/dRD,
whichunder fair burden sharing (i.e., using 1121), is equal to:
rir.1 ,.n — rv/,\_D — SJ) Lm.ALJjJJ/.MW — TW/flSJ/LW — I
Similarly, it is easy to check that the banks also get a payoff of r per
dollar of initial exposure. r can be interpreted as the "fair" exit price, and
it isgiven by the future payoff per dollar of debt if the country adjusts
net of the present value of the required new loans. Equation (12') can be
used to derive some implications of PDR:
—.— .1 1 - - —I ___—._ II— A -.. .-l, T VT 4 t- 4nn WhiCh7 — U, AC. , whICH LEIC [heW iUdhi LS LUVkiLCU Uy LLLC it SO Lit ii
capital  gains  on  the  existing  stock  of  debt  RD(p’-  p)  and  the  capital  losses 
on  the  new  loans  RL(l-p’)  and  on  the  forgiven  debt  RBp’.  It  can  be  checked 
that  the  net  financial  gain  T  -  RD(p’-  p)  -  RL(1  -p’)  -  RBp’  is  equal  to  the 
real  gain,  aBY-RL,  using  the  definitions  of  p  and  p’.  Since  the  IFIs  do  not 
engage  in  debt  relief,  their  net  payout,  I,  is  given  by  the  difference  between 
a  share  d  of  the  total  capital  gains,  and  a  share  7  of  the  loss  on  new  loans. 
PDR requires  that: 
(12)  d  -  I/T  -  IdD(e’-  P)  -  7L(l  -  p’)]  /  [D(p’-  p)  -  L(1  -  p’)  -  Bp’] 
which  can  be  rewritten  as: 
(12’)  B/L  -  [ (7  -  Q/d]  [Cl  -  e’)/p’]. 
Because  all  creditors  share  proportionally  in  the  net  financial  gain  under 
PDR,  their  net  payoff  per  dollar  of  exposure  is  the  same.  To  see  that,  note 
that  the  payoff  per  dollar  of  exposure  for  the  IFIs  is  given  by  [I+dDp]/dRD, 
which  under  fair  burden  sharing  (i.e.,  using  [12]),  is  equal  to: 
(13)  [Td+dDp]/dRD  -  [aY(l+f’)-RL]/RD  =  7. 
Similarly,  it  is  easy  to  check  that  the  banks  also  get  a  payoff  of  +  per 
dollar  of  initial  exposure.  z  can  be  interpreted  as  the  “fair”  exit  price,  and 
it  is  given  by  the  future  payoff  per  dollar  of  debt  if  the  country  adjusts, 
net  of  the  present  value  of  the  required  new  loans.  Equation  (12’)  can  be 
used  to  derive  some implications  of  PDR: 
(i)  When -r  -  d,  i.e..  when  the  new  loan  is  provided  by  the  IFIs  in  proportion -38-
to their initial exposure, debt reduction is unnecessary, i.e., B —0. The
intuition for this result is simple: when the sharing of the burden of
providing new loans is fair, the sharing of the future payoff will also be
.....1a k.
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creditors for some further contribution in terms of debt relief.
(ii) When > d, that is, when the IFIs provide a more than proportionate
share of the new money, then B must necessarily be positive. In this
situation, banks must bear an additional burden to make up for their
proportionally small loss on the new loan. This can be done by restricting the
banks to get a smaller share of the future payout. Debt (and debt service)
a a. ._t....... LCUUCLUIL .L bUCLI aut¼LtatiLbw.L&L.LLULCcaLluc aibu LULLICUdLUULLU.WILeLL UdLWS
offer debt relief, PDR requires that this loss be made up by their provision
of a smaller than proportionate share of the new loan L.
(iii) As long as d >0and y > d, the debtor remain in overhang after
the debt deal is conpleted. The reason is that when d>O, the IFIs niust also
share the burden. But since they do not provide debt reduction, they would
remain whole unless thenewprice of debt, p', remains below unity. This can
._-l__--— ,,n. —— ., 1 flue 4--.lflh1 Ut CCAI £LJLU V9ULL%JL1 ISL/ a p UCb CU £, List EUL. guts LU
p)/[D(l-p)-Bwhich is larger than d. For the same reason, banks Cannot be
asked under PD?. to provide all the debt reduction needed to return the debtor
to full creditworthiness.
In practice, the secondary-market discount rarely disappears following
Brady-type deals. This is consistent with the above, in that the overhang
should disappear under PDR only in the case where the IFIs have no initial
-----—- —'--_,__t_ -- -- t__ __,___ —----—- __t____ .-k... expusute LOLEIC UOLOL counLLy.DULneremay oe ocnet reasons LOCUO
pricewill not go to unity after a debt deal is completed. One possibility is
that perhaps IFIs subsidizing the banks. In this interpretation IFIs have
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to  their  initial  exposure,  debt  reduction  is  unnecessary,  i.e.,  B  -  0.  The 
intuition  for  this  result  is  simple:  when  the  sharing  of  the  burden  of 
providing  new  loans  is  "fair",  the  sharing  of  the  future  payoff  will  also  be 
"fair".  In  these  circumstances,  it  would  be  "unfair"  to  ask  the  commercial 
creditors  for  some  further  contribution  in  terms  of  debt  relief. 
(ii)  When  7  >  d,  that  is,  when  the  IFIs  provide  a  more  than  proportionate 
share  of  the  new  money,  then  B  must  necessarily  be  positive.  In  this 
situation,  banks  must  bear  an  additional  burden  to  make  up  for  their 
proportionally  small  loss  on  the  new  loan.  This  can  be  done  by  restricting  the 
banks  to  get  a  smaller  share  of  the  future  payout.  Debt  (and  debt  service) 
reduction  is  such  a  mechanism.  This  rule  can  be  also  turned  around:  when  banks 
offer  debt  relief,  PDR  requires  that  this  loss  be  made  up  by  their  provision 
of  a  smaller  than  proportionate  share  of  the  new  loan  L. 
(iii)  As  long  as  d  >  0  and  7  >  d,  the  debtor  must  remain  in  overhang  after 
the  debt  deal  is  completed.  The  reason  is  that  when  60,  the  IFIs  must  also 
share  the  burden.  But  since  they  do  not  provide  debt  reduction,  they  would 
remain  whole  unless  the  new  price  of  debt,  p',  remains  below  unity.  This  can 
also  be  seen  from  equation  (12):  as  p'  goes  to  1.  the  RHS  goes  to  dD(l- 
p)/[D(l-p)-B]  which  is  larger  than  d.  For  the  same  reason,  banks  cannot  be 
asked  under  PDR  to  provide  all  the  debt  reduction  needed  to  return  the  debtor 
to  full  creditworthiness. 
In  practice,  the  secondary-market  discount  rarely  disappears  following 
Brady-type  deals.  This  is  consistent  with  the  above,  in  that  the  overhang 
should  disappear  under  PDR  only  in  the  case  where  the  IFIs  have  no  initial 
exposure  to  the  debtor  country.  But  there  may  be  other  reasons  why  the  debt 
price  will  not  go  to  unity  after  a  debt  deal  is  completed.  One  possibility  is 
that  perhaps  IFIs  are  subsidizing  the  banks.  In  this  interpretation,  IFIs  have -39-
not been forceful enough in asking for more debt reduction on the part of the
banks. Moreover we have so far assumed that IFI participation buys
conditionality with certainty. In practice, doubts may remain as to the
,...al4t-t,etf rho rnnvilt4nnnl it-vnrlI-hoc. tani,ie ha raflnrtaei in I-ha carnnelnrv
market discount.
Finally, we discuss the determinants of the country's welfare. As argued
above, the country could lose if unconditional lending would have occurred in
the absence of IFIs. It could thus trytobargain for liquidity above L*c in
order to enter a program(andpossibly as large as L*). Note that although
debt reduction does not directly affect economic behavior in the debtor
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differentcreditors, there may still be indirect effects. Whenthecreditors
are locked together in bargaining, there is uncertainty in the country as to
whether an adjustment program with external financial support will
materialize. This depresses economic activity. A debt reduction agreement
signals that the burden sharing issue has been resolved and that an adiustment
program with adequate support will materialize. The announcement effect then
has positive value to the extent that the country gains from such a program.
VI. Brady Deals
We now turn to schemes which are closer to actual grady deals, in which
IFIs provide the resources to retire a portion of the debt (at some price
hn1,., .Aat._t___, _A1._ 1____ 1_ ..t... tI....__*t A..t._ LJcs'J— tJa., aa wcLL aauusLsutlas. aujuscuiei*u tuditS. LU Lilt UCUL
reductionschemes discussed above, we were assuming that this debt repurchase
was taking place at a price of zero. More genera1ly the repurchase will take
place at a negotiated price, 6. What we will show is that by setting
appropriately a price and a level of debt repurchase, the efficiency gains can
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not  been  forceful  enough  in  asking  for  more  debt  reduction  on  the  part  of  the 
banks.  Moreover,  we  have  so  far  assumed  that  IF1  participation  buys 
conditionality  with  certainty.  In  practice,  doubts  may  remain  as  to  the 
quality  of  the  conditionality,  and  these  would  be  reflected  in  the  secondary 
market  discount. 
Finally,  we  discuss  the  determinants  of  the  country's  welfare.  As  argued 
above,  the  country  could  lose  if  unconditional  lending  would  have  occurred  in 
the  absence  of  IFIs.  It  could  thus  try  to  bargain  for  liquidity  above  L',  in 
order  to  enter  a  program  (and  possibly  as  large  as  L’).  Note  that  although 
debt  reduction  does  not  directly  affect  economic  behavior  in  the  debtor 
economy  but  rather  redistributes  the  burden  of  financing  adjustment  between 
different  creditors,  there  may  still  be  indirect  effects.  When the  creditors 
are  locked  together  in  bargaining,  there  is  uncertainty  in  the  country  as  to 
whether  an  adjustment  program  with  external  financial  support  will 
materialize.  This  depresses  economic  activity.  A  debt  reduction  agreement 
signals  that  the  burden  sharing  issue  has  been  resolved  and  that  an  adjustment 
program  with  adequate  support  will  materialize.  The  announcement  effect  then 
has  positive  value  to  the  extent  that  the  country  gains  from  such  a  program. 
VI.  Brad7  Deals 
We now  turn  to  schemes which  are  closer  to  actual  Brady  deals,  in  which 
IFIs  provide  the  resources  to  retire  a  portion  of  the  debt  (at  some price 
below  par)  as  well  as  additional  adjustment  loans.  In  the  "pure"  debt 
reduction  schemes  discussed  above,  we were  assuming  that  this  debt  repurchase 
was  taking  place  at  a  price  of  zero.  More  generally,  the  repurchase  will  take 
place  at  a  negotiated  price,  6.  What  we  will  show  is  that  by  setting 
appropriately  a  price  and  a  level  of  debt  repurchase,  the  efficiency  gains  can -40-
be divided between the banks and the debtor in any desired manner.
We suppose that the debt package has the following components:
(1) an adjustment loan of yL*c from the IFIs, in return for
conditionality;
(ii) a loan to the country from IFIs of 6?, to be used in retiring
amount of debt at price 6 (< 1);
(iii) agreement on the part of the banks that they will put up new
money of (l--y)L and will sell off B amount of debt at price .
Wpw111 take -lhereas Liven, and look at different nairs of & and Btosee 0 — -— -
howthe deal can be structured to split the gains.
The participation' constraints ot the IFIs and the creditor banks now
also depend on the exit price 8. The IFIs will not participate in the deal
unless B —B(i, L, d, a, 6, 8), with 3B"/86 >0as long as 8 is
small enough. When 6 is close enough to p' ,theIFIs will be losers. (This is
discussed more formally below in the context of the proportional distribution
ruin'iTi-dc ic rnnrecntnd in fiuurn 4 The ana1ootis narticination - ——-— —--——---o——— — --
constraintfor the banks is now given by B B —B(y, L, d, o, 0, S), with
3B'/36 >0 for &<p'. Of course, when 8 exceeds p', banks will be happy to
sell more debt. Note that the minimum price at which banks are willing to sell
the entire debt stock is thepre-dealmarizet price, p —o'/RD.Therange of
feasible, mutually-advantageous programs is represented by the shaded area in
Figure 4. The closer we move to the B'' schedule, the more beneficial to the
barks' rterasts does the roram heome The figureshowsthe eeneral — — a
--
tendencyfor the requisite amount of debt reduction to increase as the
repurchase price rises. We also note from Figure 4 that banks are willing to
"sell off" as much as Bb of debt at a price zero (that is, provide pure debt
reduction of Bb). Debt buybacks at any price above Bm transfers resources to
the banks. This is akin to the Bulow-Rogoff argument against partial buybacks
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be  divided  between  the  banks  and  the  debtor  in  any  desired  manner. 
We  suppose  that  the  debt  package  has  the  following  components: 
(i)  an  adjustment  loan  of  7L*,  from  the  IFIs,  in  return  for 
conditionality; 
(ii)  a  loan  to  the  country  from  IFIs  of  6B,  to  be  used  in  retiring 
B  amount  of  debt  at  price  6  (<  1); 
(iii)  agreement  on  th:  part  of  the  banks  that  they  will  put  up  new 
money  of  (l-y)L,  and  will  sell  off  B  amount  of  debt  at  price  6. 
We  will  take  1  here  as  given,  and  look  at  different  pairs  of  6  and  B  to  see 
how  the  deal  can  be  structured  to  split  the  gains. 
The  "participation"  constraints  of  the  IFIs  and  the  creditor  banks  now 
also  depend  on  the  exit  price  6.  The  IFIs  will  not  participate  in  the  deal 
unless  B  t  Bmi"  -  B  (7,  L,  d.  o,  8,  6).  with  aBm'"/a6  >  0  as  long  as  6  is 
small  enough.  When  6  is  close  enough  to  p',  the  IFIs  will  be  losers.  (This  is 
discussed  more  formally  below  in  the  context  of  the  proportional  distribution 
rule.)  This  is  represented  in  figure  4.  The  analogous  participation 
constraint  for  the  banks  is  now  given  by  B  5  BmU  -  B  (7,  L,  d,  o,  0,  a),  with 
aBm*/a6  >  0  for  6<p'.  Of  course,  when  6  exceeds  p',  banks  will  be  happy  to 
sell  more  debt.  Note  that  the  minimum  price  at  which  banks  are  willing  to  sell 
the  entire  debt  stock  is  rhc  pre-deal  market  price,  p  -  aY/RD.  The  range  of 
feasible,  mutually-advantageous  programs  is  represented  by  the  shaded  area  in 
Figure  4.  The  closer  we  move  to  the  Bmi"  schedule,  the  more  beneficial  to  the 
banks'  interests  does  the  program  become.  The  figure  shows  the  general 
tendency  for  the  requisite  amount  of  debt  reduction  to  increase  as  the 
repurchase  price  rises.  We  also  note  from  Figure  4  that  banks  are  willing  to 
"sell  off"  as  much  as  Bb  of  debt  at  a  price  zero  (that  is,  provide  pure  debt 
reduction  of  Bb).  Debt  buybacks  at  any  price  above  Bm'"  transfers  resources  to 
the  banks.  This  is  akin  to  the  Bulow-Rogoff  argument  against  partial  buybacks -41-
--a -__t__ ——
at themarketprice. ut tre cruc].aJ. story nere is tne aistrioution oz
efficiency gains.
Finally, we repeat the application of the proportional distribution rule
to this case, when debt reduction is costly. The cost of debt reduction ES is
financed by the IFIs in addition to their contribution of a share y of L (note
t-ht-therere limitson the ratio B/yL.setat the Bankandthe Fund between












which is equal to (12') when 6—0. As 5 increases, increases as well. The
intuition is that banks are getting an early payoff compared to the pure
relief case. As a result, the IFIs require a larger share of future earnings,
and this is done with larger buybacks. This can only work as long as 6<p and
the implied B is smaller than (l-d)D. At some 6 <p ,allthe commercial
debt would need to be retired.5 One important implication is that PDR is
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at  the  market  price.  But  the  crucial  story  here  ia  the  distribution  of 
efficiency  gains. 
Finally,  we  repeat  the  application  of  the  proportional  distribution  rule 
to  this  case,  when  debt  reduction  is  costly.  The  cost  of  debt  reduction  B6  is 
financed  by  the  IFIs  in  addition  to  their  contribution  of  a  share  7  of  L  (note 
that  there  are  limits  on  the  ratio  BC/yL,  set  at  the  Bank  and  the  Fund  between 
20-25  percent).  The  PDR  rule  now requires  that  the  IFIs  share  of  debt,  d,  be 
set  equal  to: 
dD(p'-6)  -  yL(1  -  p')  -  B6(1  -  p') 
(14)  d  -  __-____-_--__---_--_______________ 
D(p'-6)  -  (L  +  BL)(l-p')  -  B(p'-6) 
where  p'  is  now  given  by 
(15)  P'  -  aY(l+B)/R[D-B(l-6)+L]. 
Some  algebra  leads  to: 
(16)  B/L  -  [Cl-p')(y-d)l  /  Idp'(l-6)  -  6(1-p')], 
which  is  equal  to  (12')  when  6-O.  As  6  increases,  B  increases  as  well.  The 
intuition  is  that  banks  are  getting  an  early  payoff  compared  to  the  pure 
relief  case.  As  a  result,  the  IFIs  require  a  larger  share  of  future  earnings, 
and  this  is  done  with  larger  buybacks.  This  can  only  work  as  long  as  6<p',  and 
the  implied  B  is  smaller  than  (1-d)D.  At  some  6mU<  p',  all  the  commercial 
debt  would  need  to  be  retired.'  One  important  implication  is  that  PDR  is -42-
incompatible with £ being •set equal to p'. That is, the 'fair" exit price lies
below the post deal market price.
Finally, note that the larger (-y-d) is, i.e, the more asymmetric is the
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distribution of new loans is, the smaller must be the price at which debt is
retired.
If debt is repurchased on the secondary market, then the price that must
be paid is the equilibrium price of debt claims after the debt reduction, p'
As a result, deals that require proportional burden sharing (PDR) cannot rely
on market buybacks to achieve the desired debt reduction. Rather, concerted
AahpraA,. C,.;1..-.-. SCL_t I__4- c._SLAL.l_s_.J,,a LJfl4-4aL4-IC W ¼#L fl.C¼1 #LL 4-_J t/VCL_JUtC •_t..h_ I..JJLtJAL1aLLIJLL LaLL44LC
Ideally,each creditor bank would sell a specific share of its claims at a
price below the expected ex-post price p. In practice, this may prove
difficult since free-riding remains the dominant strategy for each bank. But
any amount of coordination would still represent an improvement over the
market approach.
A more important problem with the concerted approach is caused by
t.t.:_..L... t.__._ Vt __3:....__... 2:ct_._ :._1.. tieeugetieiuy WILLISLI Lile UdhItcS gLUUp. IL CLOUILULS uILieL WI LII LCStCL LU
. Rewrite(16) as G(B,6) —-p(B)(L(7-d)+Bd(1-8)+B6)+L(-y-d)4-8—0;we have:
— - where—B[1-p(1-d)]>0,and —- (3p/8B)L(7-d)+d(1
5)+B81 -vFd(1-fl+fl+S.which is negative when S is small, and equal to
zero when & reaches 6 <p'Note that as -ygetssmaller, there is more room
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incompatible  with  6  being  set  equal  to  p'.  That  is,  the  "fair"  exit  price  lies 
below  the  post  deal  market  price. 
Finally,  note  that  the  larger  (y-d)  is.  i.e,  the  more  asymmetric  is  the 
sharing  of  the  new  loans,  the  lower  is  6"".  Thus.  the  more  unfair  the 
distribution  of  new  loans  is,  the  SmalleK  must  be  the  price  at  which  debt  is 
retired. 
If  debt  is  repurchased  on  the  secondary  market,  then  the  price  that  must 
be  paid  is  the  equilibrium  price  of  debt  claims  after  the  debt  reduction,  p'. 
As  a  result,  deals  that  require  proportional  burden  sharing  (PDR)  cannot  rely 
on  market  buybacks  to  achieve  the  desired  debt  reduction.  Rather,  concerted 
debt  reductions  must  be  worked  out  to  OveKCOme  this  coordination  failure. 
Ideally,  each  CKeditOK  bank  would  sell  a  specific  share  of  its  claims  at  a 
price  below  the  expected  ex-post  price  p'.  In  practice,  this  may  prove 
difficult  since  free-riding  remains  the  dominant  strategy  for  each  bank.  But 
any  amount  of  coordination  would  still  represent  an  improvement  over  the 
market  approach. 
A  more  important  problem  with  the  concerted  approach  is  caused  by 
heterogeneity  within  the  banks'  group.  If  creditors  differ  vith  respect  to 
5 .  Rewrite  (16)  as  C(B,6)  -  -p'(B)[L(y-d)+Bd(l-6)+96)+L(y-d)+B6  -  0;  we  have: 
as/66  -  -  GJG,,  where  C,  -  B[l-p'(l-d)]  >  0,  and  G,  -  -  (ap'/aB)[L(y-d)+Bd(l- 
6)+96]  -  p'[d(l-6)+6-l  +  6,  which  is  negative  when  6  is  small,  and  equal  to 
zero  when  6  reaches  gmaX  <  p'.  Note  that  as  7  gets  smaller,  there  is  more  room -43-
their ownvaluationo country debt, a concerted buyback that does not
discriminate among banks and that at the same time hurts no bank must occur at
the reservation price of the bank with the highest valuation. Attempts to
discriminate between creditors require unobservable information and create
moral hazard. On this score, the market mechanism is more efficient in that it
alla..e,.raAr..ni, p.,, en1F_nlanp.,.,4t-1-. a,,lt, p.l,aea ,.,tt-k 1... ..al,.at-4,n eallt.,. as. sssLI
outat a particular offer price.
VII. The Xenu Approach and Burden Sharing Aaong Creditor Banks
Recent agreements have focused on a menu of options from which the
creditors will select later. An agreed upon menu is a contract, which may be
partly implicit, establishing a future opportunity set for the lenders. The
ra a,,4 r ari-, .- 1 ,. A,, — —at.,,.,... C I — — a — C 14 *SS L¼1 •_LflJIflC £Luut a LLLiLLU CL VL
options ex post. By combining concerted and voluntary characteristics, the
menu approach to debt reduction retains the advantages but not the
inconveniences of pure market and pure concerted mechanisms described above.
The options on the menu and their relative pricing are negotiated first; in a
second round, each creditor freely chooses his preferred option. Overall, the
discrimination allowed by the menu allows for larger actual relief, for a
w111, ,f T100fl1 c...- o — - •— - --- — — — — —'—a-s'-ss.—sc C Id S —I at _It1dSC6CS''- "' a
formaltreatment).
For a menu of options to allow different creditors to choose different
options voluntarily, the value of all options must be comparable.
Interestingly this works out mechanically when the menu includes exit and
relending options, because each of these options becomes more valuable as the
other option is picked by too many banks. In equilibrium, all options will
rnmnnr,h1ns,..1,.,,., '1'...11 1.... 1 _.L_. a._.1 AIJ LLLUSCLdLe CutS CtaklU, Wt UCVCIUp UWLUW Lilt
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their  own  valuation  of  country  debt,  a  concarted  buyback  that  does  not 
discriminate  among banks  and  that  at  the  same time  hurts  no  bank  must  occur  at 
the  reservation  price  of  the  bank  with  the  highest  valuation.  Attempts  to 
discriminate  between  creditors  require  unobservable  information  and  create 
moral  hazard.  On  this  score,  the  market  mechanism  is  more  efficient  in  that  it 
allows  creditors  to  self-select,  with  only  those  with  low  valuation  selling 
out  at  a  particular  offer  price. 
VII.  The  Ifem  Approach  end  Burden  Shering  Among  Creditor  Beaks 
Recent  agreements  have  focused  on  a  menu of  options  from  which  the 
creditors  will  select  later.  An  agreed  upon  menu  is  a  contract,  which  may  be 
partly  implicit,  establishing  a  future  opportunity  set  for  the  lenders.  The 
menu approach  requires  that  lenders  commit  to  choose  from  a  restricted  set  of 
options  ex  post.  By  combining  concerted  and  voluntary  characteristics,  the 
menu approach  to  debt  reduction  retains  the  advantages,  but  not  the 
inconveniences  of  pure  market  and  pure  concerted  mechanisms  described  above. 
The  options  on  the  menu  and  their  relative  pricing  are  negotiated  first;  in  a 
second  round,  each  creditor  freely  chooses  his  preferred  option.  Overall,  the 
discrimination  allowed  by  the  menu allows  for  larger  actual  relief,  for  a 
given  willingness  of  banks  to  offer  relief  (see  Diwan  and  Spiegel  [1990]  for  a 
formal  treatment). 
For  a  menu of  options  to  allow  different  creditors  to  choose  different 
options  voluntarily,  the  value  of  all  options  must  be  comparable. 
Interestingly,  this  works  out  mechanically  when  the  menu  includes  exit  and 
relending  options,  because  each  of  these  options  becomes more  valuable  as  the 
other  option  is  picked  by  too  many  banks.  In  equilibrium,  all  options  will 
have  comparable  values.  To  illustrate  this  claim,  we  develop  below  the -44-
equilibrium analysis for the simplest case where all banks are similar.
Suppose that the creditors (including the IFIs) have agreed with the
debtor country on a simple menu of options represented by the pair (5, n): for
arb r4 ri 1,r v-s F ,— 1a4ynti, a,., hal.4,,raA4s—arean j-.ane a 4— 4 — — .LLLtCL A1L dl.. a puce
of6, or to reschedule the loan and relend n dollars in addition. To see that
in equilibrium both options will have the same value, let D1 stand for debt





Lenders choose between the two options in a manner that maximizes the
value of their assets subject to the terms of the menu (5, n). After the deal
Icrnmnlntnd elaht nr4roc rn ovnort-oA t-n ha k4nha rrn'-n..,-V/fl L —"I
creditorthat relends n dollars will have its old claim revalued. However, its
new claim n will be only valued at p, implying a capital loss of (1 -p').
Thus, the opportunity cost of holding a unit of debt back frotn repurchase at
priceis p'(l+n) -n.This implies that when p' exceeds (6+n)/(1+n), the new
money option is preferred to the exit option. Thus, less debt will be sold and
more new money offered, resulting in less than expected debt reduction. This
Leaus co an increase in LI1usingeq. [L/J)anacnus to a reuction in p
(using eq. [18]). Since creditors are price-takers when they optimize ex post,
and because the expected present value of debt p' is strictly concave, the
-44- 
equilibrium  analysis  for  the  simplest  case  where  all  banks  are  similar. 
Suppose  that  the  creditors  (including  the  IFIs)  have  agreed  with  the 
debtor  country  on  a  simple  menu  of  options  represented  by  the  pair  (6,  n):  for 
each  dollar  of  claim  they  hold,  creditors  can  choose  to  either  exit  at  a  price 
of  6.  OK  to  reschedule  the  loan  and  relend  n  dollars  in  addition.  To  see  that 
in  equilibrium  both  options  will  have  the  same  value,  let  D,  stand  for  debt 
stock  after  the  completion  of  the  exchange  and  N  fOK  the  total  amount  of  new 
money.  We  have: 
(17)  D,  -  R[D  -  B  +  N] 
(18)  p'  -  oY(l+B)  /  D, 
(19)  n-N/(D  -  B] 
Lenders  choose  between  the  two  options  in  a  manner  that  maximizes  the 
value  of  their  assets  subject  to  the  terms  of  the  menu  (6,  n).  After  the  deal 
is  completed,  debt  prices  are  expected  to  be  higher  at  p'  >  p  -  oY/;d).  b 
CKeditOK  that  relends  n  dollars  will  have  its  old  claim  revalued.  HOWWK,  its 
new  claim  n  will  be  only  valued  at  p'.  implying  a  capital  loss  of  (1  -  p'). 
Thus,  the  opportunity  cost  of  holding  a  unit  of  debt  back  from  repurchase  at 
price  6  is  p'(l+n)  -  n.  This  implies  that  when  p'  exceeds  (&+n)/(l+n),  the  new 
money  option  is  preferred  to  the  exit  option.  Thus,  less  debt  will  be  sold  and 
more  new  money  offered,  resulting  in  less  than  expected  debt  reduction.  This 
leads  to  an  increase  in  D,  (using  eq.  [17]),  and  thus  to  a  reduction  in  p' 
(using  eq.  [18]).  Since  CKeditOKs  are  price-takers  when  they  optimize  ex  post, 
and  because  the  expected  present  value  of  debt  p'  is  strictly  concave,  the -45-
solution Co portfolio value maximization by creditors is unique. In
equilibrium, we must then have:
— (8 ÷n I(1 + n
C-
The system of equations (17) to (20) can be solved for B ,N,D1 and p' as a
function of any menu (&,n). Any menu (6,n) will produce an equilibriulD (B,N)
in which all the creditors, whether they exit or relend, retain a net payoff
exactly equal to 8.Thus,all menus (8,n) involve a proportional distribution
of the net gains. In particular, if the menu is offered to all creditors, IFIs
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classesof creditors will be achieved, and the requirements of PDR will •be
necessarily satisfied. (Once again, we leave aside the question of whether
this involves a "fair" burdensharing or not.)
But for a menu to be able to support the conditional adjustment program
(S.n should be set so that sufficient new loans are raised to finance both
the adjustment, L, and the buybacks, B6. Which menus raise exactly L —
(N-6)? To answer this, feed equations (1/) and (18) into (20). We have:
(21) Y(1+8)/R(D-B÷N) —(8 + n)/(1÷ n)
—(6+[N/(D-E)1}/(1+(N/(D-B)))
i,c4n,p f1O\ e4...'.. 4......11 . — fltflrT* 1.$...kimt SA.'/ wLSs._LL LLLa — ci StOW S CC
L*c.Solving for 6, we get 6 —[czY(l+O)RL*c]/RD—r,using (13).
Thus, when 6 is set equal to the "fair" exit price r, any n will produce
a menu that raises on a net basis exactly L*. That 6—r is necessary to
achieve a menu deal that raises L of net financing is not surprising
solution  to  portfolio  value  maximization  by  creditors  is  unique.  In 
equilibrium,  we  must  then  have: 
(20)  P'  -  (6  +  n)  /  (1  +  n) 
The  system  of  equations  (17)  to  (20)  can  be  solved  for  B  ,  N,  D,  and  p'  as  a 
function  of  any  menu  (6,n).  Any  menu  (6,n)  will  produce  an  equilibrium  (B,N) 
in  which  all  the  creditors,  whether  they  exit  or  relend,  retain  a  net  payoff 
exactly  equal  to  6.  Thus,  all  menus  (6,n)  involve  a  proportional  distribution 
of  the  net  gains.  In  particular,  if  the  menu  is  offered  to  all  creditors,  IFIs 
as  well  as  commercial  banks,  a  proportional  sharing  of  the  burden  across  both 
classes  of  creditors  will  be  achieved,  and  the  requirements  of  PDR  will  be 
necessarily  satisfied.  (Once  again,  we  leave  aside  the  question  of  whether 
this  involves  a  "fair"  burden'sharing  or  not.) 
But  for  a  menu  to  be  able  to  support  the  conditional  adjustment  program, 
(6.n)  should  be  set  so  that  sufficient  new  loans  are  raised  to  finance  both 
the  adjustment,  L*,,  and  the  buybacks,  B6.  Which  menus  raise  exactly  L',  - 
(N-6B)?  To  answer  this,  feed  equations  (17)  and  (18)  into  (20).  Ue  have: 
(21)  oY(l+B)/R(D-B+N)  -  (6  +  n)  /  (1  +  n) 
-  (6+[N/(D-B)l)/[l+(N/(D-B))] 
using  (19),  which  implies  that  oY(l+B)  -  R[CD+L*,)  when  N-6B  is  set  equal  to 
L',.  Solving  for  6,  we  get  6  -  [aY(l+B)-RL*,]/RD  =  7,  using  (13). 
Thus,  when  6  is  set  equal  to  the  "fair"  exit  price  T,  any  n  will  produce 
a  menu  that  raises  on  a  net  basis  exactly  L*,.  That  6-r  is  necessary  to 
achieve  a  menu  deal  that  raises  L°C  of  net  financing  is  not  surprising -46-
becasue both options gust have the same value, and because proportional burden
sharing with sufficient financing leaves a payoff of r per dollar of initial
debt. Whatismore surprising is that when —r,theonly effect of varying n
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nonet effect on the liquidity L that is raised.
To see this more clearly, we analyze how the equilibrium (B,N) and the
net financing raised N-SB vary as the new money call, n, is increased. We do
not impose that N-6D be equal to L*c. Rather, we look for theeffectof the
menu on the amounts raised. Differentiating (21) with respect to n and
rearranging, we get:
(22) 3N/øn —[aY(l+9)-N]/(6+n)>0for n small erough.
The effect of n is ambiguous. On the one hand, as n increases, new money is
increased for any given choices by banks. But on the other hand, an increase
in n makes exit more desirable and thus reduces the base for the new money
call. The total effect is positive as long as n does not exceed some maximum
1ra 1 (.i, a r en in ,-r.., tjni ii A net tin nt 1n 10 nfl r1a Aar 1 4 in inn in rt-en if rh a npw n,nne v
curve). The importance of this result for our purposes is that when IFIs are
keen on delivering their share of the burden in the form of new loans rather
than in the form of debt reduction, then n should be set large enough to lead
to an equilibrium with a new money contribution that is large enough to
accomodate their exposure. Given banks preferences between the two
instruments, a larger exposure of the IFIs should lead to a larger n under
proporconai ourcen snaring.
Similarly, to see the effect of n on the amount of debt reduction
achieved in equilibrium, differentiate (8) with respect to n to get:
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becasue  both  options  must  have  the  same value,  and  because  proportional  burden 
sharing  with  sufficient  financing  leaves  a  payoff  of  7  per  dollar  of  initial 
debt.  What  is  more  surprising  is  that  when  S-r,  the  only  effect  of  varying  n 
is  to  increase  the  equilibrium  volume  of  both  buybacks  and  new money.  but  with 
no  net  effect  on  the  liquidity  L  that  is  raised. 
To  see  this  more  clearly,  we  analyze  how  the  equilibrium  (B,N)  and  the 
net  financing  raised  N-6B  vary  as  the  new  money  call,  n,  is  increased.  We do 
not  impose  that  N-6D  be  equal  to  L',.  Rather,  we  look  for  the  effect  of  the 
menu on  the  amounts  raised.  Differentiating  (21)  with  respect  to  n  and 
rearranging,  we  get: 
(22)  aN/an  -  [oY(l+B)-N]/(C+n)  >  0  for  n  small  enough 
The  effect  of  n  is  ambiguous.  On  the  one  hand,  as  n  increases,  new  money  is 
increased  for  any  given  choices  by  banks.  But  on  the  other  hand,  an  increase 
in  n  makes  exit  more  desirable  and  thus  reduces  the  base  for  the  new money 
call.  The  total  effect  is  positive  as  long  as  n  does  not  exceed  some maximum 
level  (the  country  would  not  want  to  be  on  the  declining  part  of  the  new  mane) 
curve).  The  importance  of  this  result  for  our  purposes  is  that  when  IFIs  are 
keen  on  delivering  their  share  of  the  burden  in  the  form  of  new  loans  rather 
than  in  the  form  of  debt  reduction,  then  n  should  be  set  large  enough  to  lead 
to  an  equilibrium  with  a  new  money  contribution  that  is  large  enough  to 
accomodate  their  exposure.  Given  banks  preferences  between  the  two 
instruments,  a  larger  exposure  of  the  IFIs  should  lead  to  a  larger  n  under 
proportional  burden  sharing. 
Similarly,  to  see  the  effect  of  n  on  the  amount  of  debt  reduction 
achieved  in  equilibrium,  differentiate  (8)  with  respect  to  n  to  get: -47-
(23) 8B/8n —-[(ÔN/3n)n-N)1/n2 >0
The equilibrium amount of debt reduction is increasing in n. As the new money
call, n, is increased, the exit option becoies more desirable than the
P.,.-4.,,.,4141..,-4..n1,,..4, .,.,.4 i,.,
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Asa result, a larger debt reduction will be achieved in order to raise
further the ex post debt price p' and increase the attractiveness of the
relending option.
Consequently, increasing n leads to larger buybacks and larger new
money in equilibrium. Whatisthe net effect on the liquidity received (N-5B)?
Using (22) and (23), we find:
(24) a(N-&B)/an —(D/n)(r-6)0 as r5,
and therefore the amountofnet funds received is invariant to n when 6—r,
i.e., under proportional burden sharing. Thus, the only effect of a change in
n is indeed to accomodate different set of preferences of the creditor group.
VTTT Rrfr -0
Thispaper has covered a lot of ground. We have tried to present a
framework in which the roles of the debt overhang, adjustment lending with
conditionality, and of Brady-type arrangements involving new money and debt
and debt-service reduction could be understood and evaluated.
Our starting point has been the observation that the chief inefficiency
engendered by the existence of an overhang is the inability of debtor
rnnint-rfoc,r,- Jt £LdULe hiVes LLUCLLLS p iitciuuirtg dUJ US Clhltil C L UgL aLas
(23)  aB/an  -  -  [ (aN/an)n-N)]/n'  >  0 
The  equilibrium  amount  of  debt  reduction  is  increasing  in  n.  As  the  new  money 
call,  n,  is  increased,  the  exit  option  becomes  more  desirable  than  the 
relending  option.  But,  in  equilibrium,  both  options  must  be  equally  desirable. 
As  a  result,  a  larger  debt  reduction  will  be  achieved  in  order  to  raise 
further  the  ex  post  debt  price  p'  and  increase  the  attractiveness  of  the 
relending  option. 
Consequently,  increasing  n  leads  to  larger  buybacks  and  larger  new 
money  in  equilibrium.  What  is  the  net  effect  on  the  liquidity  received  (N-68)? 
Using  (22)  and  (23),  we  find: 
(24)  a(N-6B)/an  -  (D/n)(r-6)  2  0  as  r  t  6, 
and  therefore  the  amount  of  net  funds  received  is  invariant  to  n  when  6-r, 
i.e.,  under  proportional  burden  sharing.  Thus,  the  only  effect  of  a  change  in 
n  is  indeed  to  accomodate  different  set  of  preferences  of  the  creditor  group. 
VIII.  ConclndLng  Remarka 
This  paper  has  covered  a  lot  of  ground.  We have  tried  to  present  a 
framework  in  which  the  roles  of  the  debt  overhang,  adjustment  lending  with 
conditionality,  and  of  Brady-type  arrangements  involving  new  money  and  debt 
and  debt-service  reduction  could  be  understood  and  evaluated. 
Our  starting  point  has  been  the  observation  that  the  chief  inefficiency 
engendered  by  the  existence  of  an  overhang  is  the  inability  of  debtor 
countries  to  finance  desirable  investments,  including  adjustment  programs,  due -48-
to lack of liquidity. We first focused on the adjustiuent decision of the
debtor overninent. We showed that a credit-constrained overnent will
undertake an adjustment program that has immediate costs but eventual benefits
only it suticient amount ot external lending is available. Since the
adjustment program benefits creditors as well (through higher debt service),
it is possible that commercial banks would finance the program on their own.
However, we showed that the amount of new lending required to "purchase
adjustment in the absence of conditionality (that is, without the involvement
nffTPTc\ ran h m.irh larapr than tha rnrrncnnnrllno .amnh,nt-whanrnnd4tlnnal4t-,.,
is present. Adjustment 1endin with conditionality therefore greatly expands
the Set of efficiency-increasing bargains between creditors and debtors.
We next turned to the implications of IFI participation for the design of
a debt package. We focused here on a proportional distributton rule (PDR)
under which net returns to different creditors are shared in proportion to
initial exposure to the debtor. Under such a rule, adjustment lending by IFIs
requires oeot or ceot service reouction Dy commercial oans. mis is true
whenever the IFIs share of new money exceeeds their share of the outstanding
debt stock, as has been the case throughout the 19Os. The point of DDSR in
our framework is not to create appropriate incentives for the debtor, as in
much of the overhang literature, but to ensure that IFIs and conunercial
creditors are treated euitablv Debt reduction rres the hadroom"
required for the more efficient lenders (IFIs) to come in without subsidizing
other creditors.
We also showed, however, that the PDR precludes a complete elimination of
the overhang and a full return to creditworthiness (unless the IFIs have no
prior exposure whatsoever). The reason is that, if the post-deal price were
to return to unity, the IFIs (which do not provide DDSR) would remain whole
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to  lack  of  liquidity.  We  first  focused  on  the  adjustment  decision  of  the 
debtor  government.  We  showed  that  a  credit-constrained  government  will 
undertake  an  adjustment  program  that  has  immediate  costs  but  eventual  benefits 
only  if  sufficient  amount  of  external  lending  is  available.  Since  the 
adjustment  program  benefits  creditors  as  well  (through  higher  debt  service), 
it  is  possible  that  commercial  banks  would  finance  the  program  on  their  own. 
However,  we  showed  that  the  amount  of  new  lending  required  to  "purchase" 
adjustment  in  the  absence  of  conditionality  (that  is,  without  the  involvement 
of  IFIs)  can  be  much  larger  than  the  corresponding  amount  when  conditionality 
is  present.  Adjustment  lending  with  conditionality  therefore  greatly  expands 
the  set  of  efficiency-increasing  bargains  between  creditors  and  debtors. 
We  next  turned  to  the  implications  of  IFI  participation  for  the  design  of 
a  debt  package.  We  focused  here  on  a  proportional  distribution  rule  (PDR) 
under  which  net  returns  to  different  creditors  are  shared  in  proportion  to 
initial  exposure  to  the  debtor.  Under  such  a  rule,  adjustment  lending  by  IFIs 
requires  debt  or  debt  service  reduction  by  commercial  banks.  This  is  true 
whenever  the  IFIs'  share  of  new  money  exceeeds  their  share  of  the  outstanding 
debt  stock,  as  has  been  the  case  throughout  the  1980s.  The  point  of  DDSR  in 
our  framework  is  not  to  create  appropriate  incentives  for  the  debtor,  as  in 
much  of  the  overhang  literature,  but  to  ensure  that  IFIs  and  commercial 
creditors  are  treated  equitably.  Debt  reduction  creates  the  "headroom" 
required  for  the  more  efficient  lenders  (IFIs)  to  come  in  without  subsidizing 
other  creditors. 
We  also  showed,  however,  that  the  PDR  precludes  a  complete  elimination  of 
the  overhang  and  a  full  return  to  creditworthiness  (unless  the  IFIs  have  no 
prior  exposure  whatsoever).  The  reason  is  that,  if  the  post-deal  price  were 
to  return  to  unity,  the  IFIs  (which  do  not  provide  DDSR)  would  remain  whole -49-
while the commerciaL banks would take a Loss on trielr UIThK.rottne same
reason, banks cannot be asked, under the PDR, for the entire debt reduction
needed to return the debtor to full creditworthiness.
We then generalized our framework to include Brady-type deals in which
IFIs lend the debtor the resources needed to retire some of the debt and
,',-dt-rs ar nreented with a menu of ontions. We showed here — -— - --- --
thatPDR. requires the exit price at which debt is retired to be below the
post-deal price. Further, the higher the share or ills in tre new money, trie
lower must this exit price be. These rule out market buybacks, as the only
equilibrium price at which debt can be repurchased in a market setting is the
equilibrium price after the debt reduction. This provides a justification for
the concerted approach contained in Brady-type arrangements.
Some of the advantages of the market-based approach are recovered by the
menus presented to commercial creditors. Such menus allow heterogeneity of
banks' valuattons tO be rettectea in banKS' criolces, ror au options on a
menu to be chosen voluntarily, the value of each must be identical. We sho.,ed
that this works out naturally when the menu contains exit and new-money
options, because each of these options becomes more valuable astheother
option is picked by an increasing number of banks. The menu also allows us to
interøret IFIs as just any other creditor group which happens to choose
relending over exit. The PDR is satisfied automatically in this context, by
vtrtue or ditterent options being valued equally in equilibrium.
We close by noting that our analysis of debt reduction extends to all
forms of new finance that provide efficiency gains. One notable example is
direct foreign Investment. Just as in the case of adjustment lending, it is
necessary to convince prospective foreign investors that their profit
røm1rtnnrnctj4ll nfl?- ha ,,t- h, raht-_cany4ra ?-n n-v4 ctlnc erailirnrc
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while  the  commercial  banks  would  take  a  loss  on  their  DDSR.  For  the  same 
reason,  banks  cannot  be  asked,  under  the  PDR,  for  the  entire  debt  reduction 
needed  to  return  the  debtor  to  full  creditworthiness. 
We  then  generalized  our  framework  to  include  Brady-type  deals  in  which 
IFIs  lend  the  debtor  the  resources  needed  to  retire  some  of  the  debt  and 
commercial  creditors  are  presented  with  a  menu  of  options.  We  showed  here 
that  PDR  requires  the  exit  price  at  which  debt  is  retired  to  be  below  the 
post-deal  price.  Further,  the  higher  the  share  of  IFIs  in  the  new  money,  the 
lower  must  this  exit  price  be.  These  rule  out  market  buybacks.  as  the  only 
equilibrium  price  at  which  debt  can  be  repurchased  in  a  market  setting  is  the 
equilibrium  price  after  the  debt  reduction.  This  provides  a  justification  for 
the  concerted  approach  contained  in  Brady-type  arrangements. 
Some  of  the  advantages  of  the  market-based  approach  are  recovered  by  the 
menus  presented  to  commercial  creditors.  Such  menus  allow  heterogeneity  of 
banks'  valuations  to  be  reflected  in  banks'  choices.  For  all  options  on  a 
menu  to  be  chosen  voluntarily,  the  value  of  each  must  be  identical.  We  showed 
that  this  works  out  naturally  when  the  menu  contains  exit  and  new-money 
options,  because  each  of  these  options  becomes  more  valuable  as  the  other 
option  is  picked  by  an  increasing  number  of  banks.  The  menu  also  allows  us  to 
interpret  IFIs  as  just  any  other  creditor  group  which  happens  to  choose 
relending  over  exit.  The  PDR  is  satisfied  automatically  in  this  context,  by 
virtue  of  different  options  being  valued  equally  in  equilibrium. 
We  close  by  noting  that  our  analysis  of  debt  reduction  extends  to  all 
forms  of  new  finance  that  provide  efficiency  gains.  One  notable  example  is 
direct  foreign  investment.  Just  as  in  the  case  of  adjustment  lending,  it  is 
necessary  to  convince  prospective  foreign  investors  that  their  profit 
remittances  will  not  be  crowded  out  by  debt-service  to  existing  creditors. -50-
Debt reduction represents a credible commitment on the part of banks that they
will effectively allow seniority to creditors that come later.
-5o- 
Debt  reduction  represents  a  credible  commitment  on  the  part  of  banks  that  they 
will  effectively  allow  seniority  to  creditors  that  come  later. -51-
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Table 1
Composition of Debt Stocks in the SIMICS, 1982-90
(billion of dollars and percentages)
Total IFIs Official Commercial Others
Debt Sector Banks
1982 29.4 7.4 18.9 63.3 10.4
1983 34.8 7.1 18.2 64.5 10.3
1984 37.6 7.0 18.4 65.7 9.0
1985 41.6 8.3 22.7 60.0 9.0
1986 45.6 10.0 23.2 58.2 8.6
1987 50.0 11.6 25.1 55.2 8.1
1988 50.1 11.3 24.8 55.9 8.1
1989 49.6 11.9 25.7 53.3 9.1
1990 48.2 13.8 26.1 44.6 15.5
Source: World Debt Tables, World Bank
Note: SIMICS stands for severely indebted middle income countries. Those are:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Ecuador,
Honduras, Hungary, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Senegal, Uruguay, Venezuela.53-
Table 2
Composition of Net Transfers in the SIMICS, 1982-90
(billion of dollars)
Total Net IFIs Bilateral Commercial Others
Transfers Creditors Banks
1982 8.1 3.8 3.9 -3.9 4.3
1983 -2.4 8.5 3.1 .13.1 -1.0
1984 -12.0 5.2 1.4 -16.5 .2.2
1985 -19.5 2.7 0.5 -21.1 -1.7
1986 -23.9 0.7 -1.1 -21.1 -2.4
1987 -23.1 -3.1 0.0 .16.9 -3.1
1988 -30.2 -3.6 -0.2 .23.9 -2.5
1989 -24.4 .2.7 -2.3 .15.9 .3.5
1990 -39.6 0.4 -5.0 -25.3 -9.7
Source: World Debt Tables, World Bank
Note: see table 1.-54-
Table 3
Behavior of Net Transfers by SIMICS, 1982-90
Dependent Variables (911)
Independent Total Net Net Transfers Net Transfers







CDP -0.0182** -0.0020 -0.0164**
(0.0041) (0.0034) (0.0020)
Exports of Goods 0.1336** 0.0896** 0.0291
and Services (0.0470) (0.0378) (0.0268)
Dummy for IMF -80.6 -223.9 232.6*
Program (246.9) (198.1) (103.5)
N 171 171 171
0.84 0.79 0.57
Notes:
Negative Net Transfers indicate transfers towards the creditors
See also table 1
Source: World Debt Tables
Standard error in parentheses
Regressions include country and year dummies
**significantat 1 percent level
*significantat 5 percent level-55-
Table 4
Adjustment Costs for Early Adjustment Countries
(percentage points)










The independent variable is the deviation between annual growth of per-capita
GD?, adjusted for terms of trade shocks, and per-capita CDP growth trend
during 1960-1980. The adjusted annual growth rate of per capita CD? is from
Heston and Summers, 1988. The trend variables for per capita growth 1960-80 in
each country was computed by regressing per capita growth of CDP on a time
variable.
Period dummies: t—0 refers to the year in which an IMP program was first
signed during the period 1977-87. t—-i refers to i years before, and t—j
refers to j years after.
Data set: Early adjustment countries are those that have received two
structural adjustment loans from the World Bank, with the first operation in
1985 or before. All had IMF Stand-by agreements.
Source: Adjustment Lending Policies for Sustainable Growth. World Bank (1990).-56-









10 0.09 0.18 0.27 0.36
20 0.18 0.36 0.54 0.73
30 0.27 0.54 0.82 1.09
40 0.36 0.73 1.09 1.45
Note: 0 is the permanent increase in the level of CDP due to adjustment.lOA( S
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